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Research on aging and mind-wandering has revealed that, while older adults 
report fewer mind-wandering episodes than do younger adults, they report proportionally 
more task-related interference (TRI; mind-wandering about task performance or 
approach), whereas younger adults report proportionally more task-unrelated thoughts 
(TUTs). It is possible that stereotype threat (ST) acts as a mind-wandering trigger in older 
adults by priming cognitive concerns, leading to increased TRI. In this experiment, a 
sample of 90 older adults was divided into three groups: a group primed for memory-
related ST, a group relieved of memory-related ST, and a control group that received no 
ST intervention. A sample of 30 younger adults was also included. Participants 
completed an automated operation span task (OSPAN) with set sizes between 3-5 letters. 
During the OSPAN participants were probed for mind-wandering. Consistent with past 
findings, younger adults reported a mean proportion of TUT reports that was significantly 
higher than those of all three older adult groups. Likewise, the younger adult group had a 
mean proportion of TRI reports that was significantly lower than those of all three older 
adult groups. Older adults primed for ST reported significantly more TRI than older 
adults relieved of ST, but not significantly more TRI than control older adults. These 
results were consistent with our hypothesis that stereotype threat may act as a mind-
wandering trigger in older adults.
 
     
STEREOTYPE THREAT AND MIND-WANDERING IN OLDER ADULTS 
 
 
by 
 
Megan L. Jordano 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
the Faculty of The Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
 
 
Greensboro 
2016 
                                                                                    
 
 
 
                                                                            Approved by 
 
                                                                            Dayna R. Touron                     .                                           
                                                                            Committee Chair 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
APPROVAL PAGE 
 
 
This thesis written by Megan L. Jordano has been approved by the following 
committee of the Faculty of The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. 
 
    Committee Chair  Dr. Dayna R. Touron                                           
          Committee Members  Dr. Michael J. Kane 
Dr. Ethan Zell 
 
 
 
           
                                                                                                                                     
                          
03/10/2016                                      .                                                 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
03/10/2016                                 .                                                 
Date of Final Oral Examination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
    Page 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii 
CHAPTER 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................1 
Mind-Wandering ..........................................................................................4 
                         Mind-Wandering and Aging ............................................................5 
  Stereotype Threat and Mind-Wandering .......................................11 
Research Aims ...........................................................................................16 
 
 II. YOUNGER ADULT PILOT EXPERIMENTS ...................................................17 
Pilot Experiment 1 .....................................................................................17 
  Methods..........................................................................................18 
  Results and Discussion ..................................................................22 
Pilot Experiment 2 .....................................................................................28 
  Methods..........................................................................................29 
  Results and Discussion ..................................................................29 
                        Aims of the Aging Study ...........................................................................35 
 
 III. AGING STUDY METHODS ..............................................................................37 
Methods......................................................................................................37 
            Participants .....................................................................................37 
            Materials and Procedure ................................................................40 
 
 IV. AGING STUDY RESULTS ................................................................................43 
IAT Results ................................................................................................43 
Mind-Wandering Variables .......................................................................45 
Operation Span Performance .....................................................................50 
Influences on Mind-Wandering and Performance .....................................52 
            Probe-Caught and Retrospective Mind-Wandering .......................54
 
iv 
 
                                                                                                                Page 
 
            Mood and Mind-Wandering ..........................................................54 
            Task Difficulty and Mind-Wandering ...........................................57 
 Task Engagement and Mind-Wandering .......................................58  
 Self-Focused Attention and Mind-Wandering ...............................63 
 Memory Anxiety, Achievement, and Locus of Control ................65 
 Other Mind-Wandering Correlates ................................................65 
Letter Recall and Math Verification Accuracy Correlates ........................67 
 
 V. AGING STUDY DISCUSSION ..........................................................................68 
 VI. GENERAL DISCUSSION ..................................................................................74 
                   
                       Conclusions .................................................................................................76 
 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................78 
FOOTNOTES ....................................................................................................................91 
APPENDIX A. THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TASK .................................................92 
APPENDIX B. PILOT EXPERIMENTS IAT INSTRUCTIONS .....................................96 
APPENDIX C. OPERATION SPAN TASK INSTRUCTIONS .....................................102 
APPENDIX D. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCALE ..................................107 
APPENDIX E. METAMEMORY IN ADULTHOOD QUESTIONNAIRE ..................109 
APPENDIX F. DUNDEE STRESS STATE QUESTIONNAIRE  
      (THOUGHT CONTENT) ..................................................................127 
APPENDIX G. DUNDEE STRESS STATE QUESTIONNAIRE 
                               (MOTIVATION)  .............................................................................129 
 
APPENDIX H. DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE ...............................................131 
APPENDIX I. LIGHTHOUSE NEAR VISUAL ACUITY ............................................140 
APPENDIX J. ADVANCE VOCABULARY TEST ......................................................141
 
v 
 
                                                                                                                Page 
APPENDIX K. PATTERN COMPARISON TASK .......................................................142 
 
APPENDIX L. NEWSPAPER REPORTS FOR STEREOTYPE  
       THREAT PRIMING .........................................................................145 
APPENDIX M. NEWSPAPER REPORTS FOR STEREOTYPE  
        THREAT RELIEF ...........................................................................147 
APPENDIX N. PILOT STUDY POST-TASK QUESTIONS ........................................149 
 
APPENDIX O. AGE-ATTITUDES IAT STIMULI .......................................................151 
 
APPENDIX P. AGING STUDY RECALL ACCURACY AND  
                              THOUGHT PROBES OVER OSPAN BLOCK ................................152 
 
APPENDIX Q. AGING STUDY YA CORRELATIONS ..............................................155 
 
APPENDIX R. AGING STUDY OVERALL OA CORRELATIONS ...........................156 
 
APPENDIX S. AGING STUDY OA CONTROL CORRELATIONS ...........................157 
 
APPENDIX T. AGING STUDY OA ST RELIEF CORRELATIONS ...........................158 
 
APPENDIX U. AGING STUDY OA ST PRIMED CORRELATIONS .........................159
 
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
    Page 
Table 1. Aging Study Demographics and Pretest Data…… .........……………………….39 
Table 2. Overall Correlations for Mind-Wandering 
                   and OSPAN Variables ....................................................................................53 
 
Table 3. PANAS and MIA Descriptive Statistics ..............................................................56 
Table 4. Post-Task Questions Descriptive Statistics..........................................................59 
Table 5. DSSQ Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................64
 
vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
  Page 
Figure 1. Pilot Study 1 Response Latencies (ms) for Compatible and 
                   Incompatible IAT Trials by Group .................................................................23 
 
Figure 2. Pilot Study 1 Mind-Wandering Proportions for Stereotype  
                  Threat Primed and Control Groups ..................................................................25 
 
Figure 3. Pilot Study 1 TRI Subtypes for Stereotype Threat Primed  
                   and Control Groups .........................................................................................26 
 
Figure 4. Pilot Study 1 OSPAN Math Verification and Letter Recall   
                  Accuracy for Stereotype Threat Primed and Control Groups ..........................27 
Figure 5. Pilot Study 2 Response Latencies (ms) for Compatible and  
                   Incompatible IAT Trials by Group .................................................................30 
Figure 6. Pilot Study 2 Mind-Wandering Proportions for Stereotype  
                  Threat Primed and Control Groups ..................................................................32 
 
Figure 7. Pilot Study 2 TRI Subtypes for Stereotype Threat Primed 
                  and Control Groups ..........................................................................................33 
 
Figure 8. Pilot Study 2 OSPAN Math Verification and Letter Recall  
                  Accuracy for Stereotype Threat Primed and Control Groups ..........................34 
Figure 9. Mean Age-Attitudes IAT Scores by Condition ..................................................44 
 
Figure 10. Mean Proportion On-Task Thoughts by Condition ..........................................45 
 
Figure 11. Mean Proportion of Task-Unrelated Thoughts by Condition ...........................46 
 
Figure 12. Mean Proportion of Task-Related Interference by Condition ..........................47 
 
Figure 13. Mean Proportion of Proactive Task-Related Interference 
                       by Condition................................................................................................48 
 
viii 
 
  Page 
Figure 14. Mean Proportion of Reactive Task-Related Interference 
                        by Condition...............................................................................................49 
 
Figure 15. Mean OSPAN Math Verification Accuracy by Condition ...............................51 
 
Figure 16. Mean OSPAN Letter Recall Accuracy by Condition .......................................51
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
             Normal aging is characterized by changes in cognitive processes. Cognitive 
performance declines on numerous cognitive tasks, including tasks that measure 
executive functions such as task flexibility, attentional control, reasoning, and working 
memory (Craik & Salthouse, 2008). Working memory has been conceptualized as a 
system that actively and temporarily holds pieces of information in mind, allowing that 
information to then be manipulated (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). It has been suggested that 
decreases in attentional control that occur with normal aging explain age differences in 
working memory capacity (WMC; Hasher & Zacks, 1988). 
Mind-wandering has been defined as a decoupling of attention from one’s 
external environment, during which attention instead becomes focused on an individual’s 
internal train of thought (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Older adults, if they are indeed 
unable to suppress interfering, off-task thoughts, should show evidence of increased 
mind-wandering compared to younger adults. However, older adults typically report less 
mind-wandering compared to younger adults on tasks where good performance depends 
on attentional control (Giambra, 1989; Grodsky & Giambra, 1990; Jackson & Balota, 
2012; Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012). Furthermore, older adults report 
qualitatively different mind-wandering episodes. Whereas younger adults typically report 
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experiencing proportionally more interfering thoughts unrelated to the current task (task 
unrelated thought; TUT), older adults report proportionally more interfering thoughts 
related to task appraisal (task-related interference; TRI; McVay et al., 2013).  
These outcomes might be explained by a perspective that assumes that mind-
wandering is expected to occur when one’s current concerns trigger the generation of 
off-task thoughts, and when working memory deficits result in failures to successfully 
inhibit those off-task thoughts (McVay & Kane, 2010a). Although being in a lab 
environment on a college campus may trigger task-unrelated thoughts in younger adults, 
that same environment may instead trigger task-related interference in older adults. 
Concerns about age-related decline (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000) may be particularly 
triggered in older adults when they enter into the testing environment, resulting in more 
TRI (McVay et al., 2012a).  
Stereotype threat, conceptualized as worrying about performing in a way that will 
confirm or reinforce a negative stereotype about a group that one belongs to (Steele & 
Aronson, 1995), may trigger these current concerns about age-related decline in older 
adults, leading to an increase in TRI (Hess et al., 2003; Rahhal et al. 2001). In this study, 
we examine whether or not stereotype threat triggers increased reporting of TRI by older 
adults as they perform a resource-demanding task (an automated version of the Operation 
Span Task).  
If stereotype threat does indeed trigger concerns about age-related decline in older 
adults, then we expected that experimentally relieving memory-related stereotype threat 
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will result in older adults reporting significantly fewer TRI episodes than the older adult 
groups that do not receive stereotype threat relief. Conversely, we expected that priming 
unrelated thought; TUT), older adults report proportionally more interfering thoughts 
related to task appraisal (task-related interference; TRI; McVay et al., 2013).  
These outcomes might be explained by a perspective that assumes that mind-
wandering is expected to occur when one’s current concerns trigger the generation of 
off-task thoughts, and when working memory deficits result in failures to successfully 
inhibit those off-task thoughts (McVay & Kane, 2010a). Although being in a lab 
environment on a college campus may trigger task-unrelated thoughts in younger adults, 
that same environment may instead trigger task-related interference in older adults. 
Concerns about age-related decline (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000) may be particularly 
triggered in older adults when they enter into the testing environment, resulting in more 
TRI (McVay et al., 2012a).  
Stereotype threat, conceptualized as worrying about performing in a way that will 
confirm or reinforce a negative stereotype about a group that one belongs to (Steele & 
Aronson, 1995), may trigger these current concerns about age-related decline in older 
adults, leading to an increase in TRI (Hess et al., 2003; Rahhal et al. 2001). In this study, 
we examine whether or not stereotype threat triggers increased reporting of TRI by older 
adults as they perform a resource-demanding task (an automated version of the Operation 
Span Task). 
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If stereotype threat does indeed trigger concerns about age-related decline in older  
adults, then we expected that experimentally relieving memory-related stereotype threat 
will result in older adults reporting significantly fewer TRI episodes than the older adult 
groups that do not receive stereotype threat relief. Conversely, we expected that priming 
memory-related stereotype threat above and beyond what is already triggered by the lab 
environment will result in older adults reporting significantly fewer TRI episodes than 
older adults that do not receive stereotype threat priming. Furthermore, we attempted to 
examine the roles that factors such as task motivation, affect, importance of memory 
ability, and anxiety play in stereotype threat induced mind-wandering episodes. 
Mind-Wandering 
Younger adults frequently report thinking about topics unrelated to their current 
activity. For example, one study that employed experience sampling methods found that 
younger adults reported experiencing task-unrelated thoughts on 30%-40% of thought 
probes (Klinger & Cox, 1987). However, a great amount of variability exists among 
subjects in terms of how frequently they report mind-wandering in daily life (McVay, 
Kane, & Kwapil, 2009). Different situational factors have been linked to increases in 
reported mind-wandering. For example, when individuals perform highly automated or 
simple tasks that require little executive control, more mind-wandering is reported 
(Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011). Additionally, 
both low task interest and low motivation have been linked to increases in off-task 
thoughts (Kane et al., 2007; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). Affect has also been shown to 
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influence the types of thoughts individuals report while completing cognitive tasks. 
Individuals who report negative affect tend to report more mind-wandering, particularly 
mind-wandering about past events, than those who report neutral or positive affect 
(Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, and Phillips, 2009). 
Importantly, mind-wandering in young adults has been linked to working memory 
capacity (WMC). Using both laboratory assessments and everyday life experience 
sampling methodology, it has been demonstrated that individuals with lower WMC mind-
wander more frequently than those with higher WMC during cognitively demanding 
tasks (Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2012a; McVay & Kane, 
2012b). Additionally, studies have found that variability in TUT rate partially mediates 
working memory capacity’s association with performance on cognitive tasks in a variety 
of domains (McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2012a; McVay & Kane, 2012b), 
indicating that the performance deficits found in lower WMC individuals may be 
partially due to their increased propensity to mind-wander. 
Mind-Wandering and Aging 
Older adults have reported less mind-wandering compared to young adults on a 
variety of cognitive tasks (Giambra, 1989; Grodsky & Giambra, 1990; Jackson & Balota, 
2012; Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012). Such observations regarding aging and 
mind-wandering are counter-intuitive given the declines in WMC commonly seen with 
increasing aging (Craik & Salthouse, 2008). Originally, it was suggested that reliance on 
retrospective questionnaires when assessing mind-wandering allowed for reporting bias 
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in older adult participants, with reluctance to admit to being off-task possibly 
contributing to the age differences in mind-wandering (Giambra, 1989). However, using 
instructions meant to encourage honest reporting of mind-wandering episodes, Giambra 
(1989) found across five experiments that older adults continued to report fewer TUTs  
than young adults. Again, this is surprising in light of work that has demonstrated that 
older adults have decreased ability to ignore both external and internal sources of 
distraction (Hasher & Zacks, 1988).  
McVay et al. (2013) suggested that misclassification of task-related interference 
may have contributed to the previously reported age-related differences in mind-
wandering. Earlier mind-wandering studies had failed to distinguish between task-
unrelated thought and task-related interference (Giambra, 1989; Giambra, 1993; Jackson 
& Balota, 2012). Although TRI experiences are tangentially related to the task at hand, 
and although both TUTs and TRI have been linked to performance deficits (McVay  
Kane, 2012a), TRI experiences are not directly concerned with responding appropriately 
to task stimuli, making TRI distinguishable from both TUTs and on-task thoughts.  
However, if a separate TRI category is not present for participants to respond to, 
people may instead misclassify these TRI experiences as being on-task, potentially 
artificially lowering the overall proportion of mind-wandering reported (McVay et al., 
2013). After asking participants to distinguish between TUTs and TRI when probed 
during a sustained attention to response task (SART), McVay and colleagues (2013) 
found that TRI did explain some of the age-related differences in mind-wandering, with 
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older adults reporting significantly more TRI experiences than younger adults. However, 
this increase in TRI did not account completely for the difference in older and younger 
adults’ proportion of off-task thoughts. Even taking into account differences in TRI, older 
adults continued to report less overall mind-wandering than young (McVay et al., 2013). 
Two different theories of mind-wandering have emerged, each volunteering an 
explanation as to why older adults report less mind-wandering than younger adults. The 
Smallwood and Schooler (2006), “resource competition” theory of mind-wandering 
asserts that off-task thoughts require executive control resources in order for them to be 
generated and maintained within consciousness. Because increased automaticity on tasks 
has been linked to more subsequent mind-wandering, it has been proposed that 
automaticity with increased practice frees up these executive control resources, allowing 
for more mind-wandering to occur (Smallwood et al., 2004). Therefore, individual 
differences in WMC would be positively rather than negatively correlated with mind-
wandering instances during simple tasks. If fewer resources are being used to complete 
the task, more resources can be then devoted to the generation and maintenance of off-
task thoughts (Levinson et al., 2012). In-the-moment reported TUTs also predict 
performance errors, possibly alluding to competition for executive control resources 
(Smallwood et al., 2004). Finally, Smallwood et al. (2009), have found that most 
instances of off-task thought are prospective, or future oriented, and it is believed that this 
form of mind-wandering that focuses on unresolved plans, goals, and concerns is 
particularly resource-demanding (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008).
 
    8 
It has been argued by others that TUTs, resulting from thinking about “unfinished 
business,” are spontaneously and unconsciously generated and require attentional control 
to enter into consciousness (Giambra, 1989). If mind-wandering requires attentional 
control, younger adults should experience increased mind-wandering, because they have  
more attentional control resources to spare when compared to older adults. Older adults, 
with less attentional control resources to spare and possibly less “unfinished business” 
than younger adults, would therefore be expected to mind-wander less than younger 
adults (Giambra, 1989).  
McVay and Kane (2010a) have proposed a theory of mind-wandering that extends 
from Giambra’s (1989) perspective.  The “Control failures x Current concerns” 
framework similarly asserts that TUTs are automatically and continuously generated in 
response to various environmental cues that prime an individual’s current goals and 
concerns (see Klinger 1971; Klinger 1999; Klinger 2009). However, this theory proposes 
that off-task thoughts only enter conscious awareness through a failure of executive 
control to suppress them. Individuals’ differences in control (as measured by WMC) are 
typically negatively correlated with proportion of TUTs (McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay 
& Kane 2012a; McVay & Kane 2012b). Additionally, individuals with higher WMC still 
suffer in terms of performance costs when they do experience TUTs.  
This “Control failures x Current concerns” view suggests that variations in mind-
wandering are due to an interaction between attentional control capabilities, motivation to 
prevent off-task thoughts, and the extent to which the environmental context primes 
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current concerns (McVay & Kane, 2010a). According to this perspective, older adults 
may have fewer off-task thoughts and more TRI compared to young adults when their 
concerns and motivation differ from those of young adults, regardless of declines in 
executive functioning. For example, when younger adults enter into a typical testing 
environment within a psychology laboratory, the familiar college campus may trigger 
current concerns regarding every day, school-related duties. This same testing 
environment may not cue older adults’ typical, more relationship-oriented current than 
younger adults, would therefore be expected to mind-wander less than younger adults 
(Giambra, 1989).  
McVay and Kane (2010a) have proposed a theory of mind-wandering that extends 
from Giambra’s (1989) perspective.  The “Control failures x Current concerns” 
framework similarly asserts that TUTs are automatically and continuously generated in 
response to various environmental cues that prime an individual’s current goals and 
concerns (see Klinger 1971; Klinger 1999; Klinger 2009). However, this theory proposes 
that off-task thoughts only enter conscious awareness through a failure of executive 
control to suppress them. Individuals’ differences in control (as measured by WMC) are 
typically negatively correlated with proportion of TUTs (McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay 
& Kane 2012a; McVay & Kane 2012b). Additionally, individuals with higher WMC still 
suffer in terms of performance costs when they do experience TUTs.  
This “Control failures x Current concerns” view suggests that variations in mind-
wandering are due to an interaction between attentional control capabilities, motivation to 
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prevent off-task thoughts, and the extent to which the environmental context primes 
current concerns (McVay & Kane, 2010a). According to this perspective, older adults 
may have fewer off-task thoughts and more TRI compared to young adults when their 
concerns and motivation differ from those of young adults, regardless of declines in  
executive functioning. For example, when younger adults enter into a typical testing 
environment within a psychology laboratory, the familiar college campus may trigger 
current concerns regarding every day, school-related duties. This same testing 
environment may not cue older adults’ typical, more relationship-oriented current 
concerns (Carstensen, 1995). However, it may instead trigger concerns about perceived 
cognitive performance and cognitive decline (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). This triggering 
of performance-related concerns may in turn lead to increased TRI. 
The finding that older adults experience increased TRI is difficult to reconcile 
with Smallwood and Schooler’s (2006) theory of mind wandering.  If mind-wandering is 
dependent on the deployment of executive control resources, then older adults, who have 
less of these resources, should report fewer instances of both TRI and TUT compared to 
young adults. However, this is not the case. Older adults report more TRI and less TUT 
compared to young adults. As an example, young adults reported experiencing TRI on 
21% of thought probes while completing a SART (McVay and Kane, 2013. These same 
young adults reported experiencing TUTs on 51% of thought probes during the SART. 
Older adults reported experiencing TRI on 31% of thought probes and experiencing 
TUTs on 17% of thought probes during the same SART (McVay & Kane, 2012b). 
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Although older adults reported less overall mind-wandering and fewer instances of TUT, 
as would be predicted by Smallwood and Schooler’s theory, TRI was much more 
frequently reported in older adults compared to younger adults. Furthermore, SART 
performance was equally affected during TUT and TRI episodes (McVay & Kane, 
2012b).  
Stereotype Threat and Mind-Wandering 
If current concerns play an important role in the generation of off-task thoughts, it 
is possible that concerns regarding cognitive decline may lead to increased TRI in older 
adults. Many individuals believe that aging causes impairment of cognitive ability, 
particularly in the domain of memory (Hummert, 1999). Older adults do perform more 
poorly than young adults on various memory tasks (for a review, see Zacks, Hasher, & 
Li, 2000). Whereas changes in the brain’s physiological structures are one underlying 
cause of age-related changes in memory performance, a social component might also 
contribute to these changes. It is believed that differential treatment of older adults 
heightens their awareness of negative aging-related beliefs held by others (Kemper, 
1994), and this leads to the possibility of stereotype threat.  
In support of this theory, it has been found that framing a memory task as an 
“impression task” reduces age differences in memory performance, at least in some 
contexts (Hess et al., 2001; Rahhal, Hasher, & Colombe, 2001; Rahhal, May, & Hasher, 
2002). Emphasizing positive rather than negative age-related stereotypes (for example, 
“wise” vs. “forgetful”) during memory task instruction can also lead to improved 
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performance (Levy, 1996). Likewise, priming of negative age-related stereotypes in older  
adults has been shown to result in heightened physiological arousal (Levy et al., 2000). 
This increase in arousal following the priming of negative stereotypes is believed to be 
the result of increased anxiety in stereotyped individuals, and this anxiety can in turn 
undermine memory performance. Indeed, activation of stereotype threat in marginalized 
groups can influence cognition by both increasing anxiety and by lowering motivation to 
succeed on tasks within the stereotyped domain (Steele & Aronson, 1995). 
Priming of age-related stereotypes can trigger stereotype threat in marginalized 
individuals. However, a variety of additional factors exist that moderate and mediate 
stereotype threat. For example, it is believed that the degree to which a marginalized 
individual values the stereotypes domain greatly influences the degree to which 
stereotype threat is experienced (Wheeler & Petty, 2001). In one study, stereotypes 
regarding aging were primed in both younger and older adults using fabricated, 
newspaper-style research reports. Participants read either two reports that presented age-
related cognitive decline as a phenomenon that was mediated by one’s environment and 
therefore not inevitable, or two reports that presented these changes as biologically-based 
and inevitable (Hess, Autman, Colcombe, & Rahhal, 2003). Younger and older adult 
controls did not read these reports. Older adults who were primed for stereotype threat 
using research reports used fewer beneficial memory strategies (e.g. clustering) and 
recalled fewer words one recall task than did young adults. These primed older adults 
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also clustered recall items less and recalled fewer words than both control older adults 
and older adults who read the positive research reports.  
Within the group of older adults primed for memory and age related stereotype 
threat, self-rated importance of memory achievement was negatively correlated with 
recall performance (Hess et al., 2013). In the same study, it was found that even the 
control older adults had recall performance and strategy use that varied as a function of 
self-rated importance of memory achievement. This relationship did not hold for the 
older adult group that underwent the stereotype threat relief manipulation. These findings 
suggest that even a normal laboratory testing situation can be sufficient to induce 
stereotype threat in older adults (Hess et al., 2003), and that importance of the 
stereotyped domain influences how stereotype threat is experienced by marginalized 
individuals.  
The age of older adult participants has also been found to moderate stereotype 
effect. Older adults seem more likely suffer from stereotype threat at the beginning of old 
age, with young-old participants (aged 60-70) performing worse on memory tasks than 
old-old participants (aged 71-85) when participants were reminded of typical age-related 
cognitive declines  (Hess & Hinson, 2006; Hess et al., 2009). Individuals just entering 
into old age may have heightened sensitivity to their new group membership, making 
associated environmental cues more salient. As a result, stigma consciousness increases 
(Pinel, 1999). Stigma consciousness refers to the extent to which a marginalized 
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individual expects to be stereotyped, and it is believed to be an important factor in 
predicting whether or not an individual experiences stereotype threat (Pinel, 1999).  
The cognitive mechanisms underlying stereotype threat based performance 
deficits have also been investigated, and it has been suggested that these mechanisms 
may differ between younger and older adults. For example, stereotype threat has been 
found to lead to decreased working memory capacity in younger adults (Blascovitch, 
Spencer, Quinn & Steele, 2001; Croizet et al., 2004; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Johns,  
Inzlicht, & Schmader, 2008). However, this finding has not been consistently replicated 
using an older adult sample (Hess & Hinson, 2006; Hess et al., 2009; Barber & Mather, 
2012, Barker, & Mather, 2013, but see Mazerolle et al., 2012). For example, Barber and 
Mather (2012) found that stereotype threat manipulations did not harm older adults’ 
ability to selectively choose learning high value information as opposed to low value 
information, even though this ability to evaluate different types of information and to 
prioritize learning accordingly is dependent on executive control abilities (Castel et al., 
2011).  
In the absence of evidence that stereotype threat operates through deficits in 
working memory capacity in older adults, it has been proposed that shifts in regulatory 
focus (Seibt & Forster, 2004) may instead explain how stereotype threat affects older 
adults’ task approach and performance. More specifically, it has been suggested that 
shifts in regulatory focus causes individuals to become more vigilant in an attempt to 
avoid making errors and confirming the negative stereotype (Seibt & Forster, 2004; 
Barber & Mather, 2013). 
 
   15 
Differences in emotional regulation may also alter how individuals respond to 
stereotype threat. Stereotype threat has been related to state anxiety, if inconsistently (for 
effects: see Chasteen, 2005 (Experiment 3), Abrams et al., 2005; for null effects: 
Chasteen, 2005 (Experiment 2); Hess & Hinson, 2006; Hess, Hinson, & Statham, 2004). 
Older adults are believed to have more well-developed emotional control abilities than do 
younger adults (Phillips, Henry, Hosie, & Mihne, 2008; Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields,  
2009). Although stereotype threat does elicit affective responses in both young women 
experiencing stereotype threat regarding mathematic ability (consistent with Cadinu, 
Maass, Rosabianca, and Kiesner, 2005) and in older adults experiencing stereotype threat 
regarding memory ability, older adults may be more able to use their better emotional 
control to suppress interfering negative self-talk and negative emotions in order to adopt 
a more careful and less error-prone response style (Popham & Hess, 2013). It has been 
demonstrated that even subtle cues within an environment may activate aging-related 
schemas in both younger and older adults, influencing participants’ task approach and 
performance without them being consciously aware of the environmental influence (Hess 
et al., 2009). If stereotype threat activation does indeed leads to increases in worry-laden 
monitoring and negative self-talk (Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, and Kiesner, 2005; 
Popham & Hess, 2013), then stereotype threat can be thought of as a mind-wandering 
trigger. 
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Research Aims 
The current aging study examined the role that stereotype threat plays in 
triggering mind-wandering, particularly task-related inference, in older adults. We did 
this by relieving stereotype threat in a group of older adults and subsequently measuring 
performance on a cognitive task that required executive control while simultaneously 
assessing mind-wandering instances using online thought probes. We compared the 
proportion of TRI, TUTs and on-task thoughts of our stereotype threat relief participants 
to a stereotype threat primed group of older adults, an older adult control group, and a 
younger adult control group. Before we examined the contribution of stereotype threat to 
older adults’ mind-wandering, we first established that mind-wandering (particularly 
TRI) is responsive to ST task and instructional manipulations. Accordingly, we 
conducted two pilot studies that examined stereotype threat induced TRI in younger 
adults.  
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CHAPTER II 
YOUNGER ADULT PILOT EXPERIMENTS 
 
 
Pilot Experiment 1 
The aging study followed-up a younger adult pilot experiment that examined the 
effects of activating stereotype threat in female participants by priming current concerns 
regarding mathematical ability. Mrazek and colleagues (2011) specifically examined 
stereotype threat and mind-wandering patterns in young adults, predicting that heightened 
anxiety in stereotyped participants would lead them to monitor internal thoughts more 
than control participants. When attention is shifted away from the task at hand, 
performance deficits may result (Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008; Schmader, Forbes, 
Zhang, & Mendes, 2009), triggering worry-laden, evaluative forms of TRI. In the study 
by Mrazek and colleagues female participants primed for math-related ST complete a 
demanding mathematical task containing thought probes. Participants also completed a 
retrospective measure of mind-wandering (the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire; 
Matthews et al., 1999), which contains both a TUT and a TRI scale. Individuals in the 
threat condition had poorer performance on a challenging math test than individuals in 
the no threat condition (Mrazek et al., 2011), and stereotype threat priming was 
associated with increased mind-wandering. Mrazek and colleagues (2011) also concluded 
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that TUTs in particular impaired performance in stereotyped individuals. Furthermore, 
anxiety was found to mediate the effect of ST on mind-wandering (Mrazek et al., 2011). 
To foreshadow, we completed two pilot studies to determine if experimentally 
manipulating stereotype threat activation can lead to impairments on task performance 
and increased mind-wandering in younger adults. Although Mrazek and colleagues 
concluded that TUTs rather than TRI impaired performance in stereotyped individuals, 
their analyses were carried out using data from retrospective mind-wandering 
assessments. We instead used categorical probes of thought content, including TRI.  In 
both pilot experiments, a group of female young adults were primed for math-related 
stereotype threat and then completed an Operation Span Task (OSPAN) containing 
thought probes presented at unpredictable internals. Participants also completed post-task 
questionnaires on self-reported mood, motivation, and anxiety. We hypothesized that 
stereotype activation would lead to an increase in probe-caught TRI. We also predicted 
that our stereotype threat primed group would have worse overall math verification 
performance on an automated OSPAN task. 
Methods 
 Participants were recruited through the UNCG Experimetrix online subject pool 
and received course credit for participation. Although we collected data from both male 
and female participants, we only analyzed the data from our female participants. Sixty 
female, undergraduate participants were divided into two groups: a stereotype threat 
primed group and a control group. Participants were recruited using an online research 
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participation pool and earned course credit for their participation. Testing lasted 
approximately one and one half hours.  
Participants in the ST primed group were told that they would complete a task 
designed to measure “quantitative capacity” in order to collect normative data about 
college students, and that this task had revealed gender differences in the past. 
Additionally, participants within the ST primed group were tested by a male 
experimenter and were always tested in a room along with either a male participant or a 
male confederate. This served as a prime for stereotype threat. Participants within the 
control group were told that they would complete a memory task in order to collect 
normative data about college students. This type of instructional manipulation has been 
widely used in the stereotype threat literature to prime math-related stereotype in female 
students.  
After completing a brief demographics questionnaire, participants in both groups 
completed a computerized version of a gender-math Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is a commonly used method of 
measuring implicit stereotype activation. This task is well-validated and widely used 
within the field of social psychology (Nosek & Smyth, 2007). In this study, we used a 
version of the IAT tailored towards assessing attitudes towards gender (male/female) and 
field of study (mathematics/liberal arts). This implicit measure of stereotype threat 
therefore served as manipulation check in this experiment (see Banaji & Hardin, 1996). 
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The IAT is described in more detail in Appendix A. Instructions for our gender-field of 
study IAT are provided in Appendix B.   
All participants then completed an automated version of the OSPAN, during 
which participants alternated between verifying mathematical equations and 
remembering letters in serial order. This OSPAN consisted of 130 trials with set sizes 
varying between two and three math problems to be verified and letters to be later 
recalled. During the OSPAN, participants were also presented with thoughts probes 
occurring at unpredictable intervals. When a probe appeared, participants were instructed 
to indicate the type of thought they had experienced just prior to the appearance of the 
probe. The instructions for the OSPAN are presented in Appendix C.  
Participants responded to a total of 10 probes. Five probes appeared during trials 
containing set sizes of two and five appeared on trials containing set sizes of three. 
Probes appeared at various points within an OSPAN trial. Probes appeared: (1) after 
participants saw the final mathematical equation within a trial, but before they verified 
the answer for that equation, (2) after the final mathematical equation within a trial had 
been verified, but before the final letter to be recalled was presented, and (3) at the end of 
a trial after participants saw the final letter to be recalled. Probes appeared approximately 
three minutes apart and remained on the screen until a response had been made. 
Participants were asked “What were you just thinking about?” and responded by selecting 
one of the following options using their computer keyboard: 
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(1) The task: Focused on completing the task, verifying equations and 
remembering letters 
(2)  Task approach: Thinking about how you can improve your task performance 
(3) Task evaluation: Evaluating how effective you were completing the task, or 
worrying about task performance 
 (4)  Everyday things: Thinking about recent or impending life events 
 (5)  Current state of being: Thinking about conditions such as hunger or 
sleepiness 
(6)  Personal worries: Thinking about concerns, troubles or fear not relating to the 
experimental task 
(7)  Daydreams: Fantasies disconnected from reality 
The thought probes participants saw on the computer screen contained all of the 
information provided in the above example. Option (1) corresponds to on-task thought, 
options (2) and (3) correspond to TRI, and options (4) through (8) correspond to various 
types of TUTs. The specific content of participants’ TRI remains unknown. Task-related 
interference may reflect a reactive form of mind-wandering, during which individuals 
assess previous performance, or a more proactive form of mind-wandering, during which 
individuals prepare for future performance by considering strategic approaches to a task. 
In this study, we broke down the TRI thought probe option into proactive TRI (Option 2) 
and reactive TRI (Option 3).  
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Participants then completed various post-task questionnaires. These included the 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegan, 1988; see 
Appendix D), which contains 20 items relating to current mood state. The PANAS was 
used as a measure of affect in this experiment. The anxiety (MIA-Anx) subscale of the 
Metamemory In Adulthood (MIA; Dixon & Hultsch, 1984; see Appendix E) 
questionnaire was used as a measure of anxiety. The Thought Content components of the 
Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews et al., 1999; see Appendix F) was 
used as an additional retrospective measure of mind-wandering and contains eight 
questions assessing TRI (e.g., “I thought about how I should work more carefully”) and 
eight questions assessing TUT (e.g., “I thought about something that happened to me 
earlier”). The Motivation component of the DSSQ, which contains 15 questions related to 
motivation level, was used as a measure of participant motivation (see Appendix G). 
Results and Discussion 
Analysis of IAT scores, instances of probe-caught mind-wandering, and math 
accuracy in the ST and control groups were conducted using one-way ANOVAs. For IAT 
scores, a main effect of group was found, F(1, 58)=7.374, p=.009, with participants in the 
stereotype threat group being slower  than participants in the control group to pair the 
concepts of “male” and “liberal arts” and the concepts of “female” and “mathematics” 
together than participants in the control group (MST = -0.23, SEST = 0.07, MControl = 0.01, 
SEControl = 0.05). This indicates stronger implicit beliefs that women are inferior to males 
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in terms of mathematical ability (see Figure 1).  We therefore believe our ST 
manipulation lead to heightened stereotype threat activation in our primed group.  
 
  
Figure 1. Pilot Study 1 Response Latencies (ms) for Compatible and Incompatible IAT Trials by 
Group.   
 
 
Probe-caught mind-wandering in the two groups was compared (see Figure 2). 
We found a main effect of group on TRI rate F(1,59) = 6.78, p = .012. Participants in the 
stereotype threat group indicated experiencing more task-related interference on thought 
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probes during the OSPAN (MST = 2.17, SEST =.26, MControl = 1.27, SEControl =.23). Again, 
we believe that the stereotype threat priming procedure led to increased worry-laden 
monitoring of performance in our stereotype threat group, which is reflected in increased 
TRI. Participants in the ST group reported a higher proportion of proactive TRI than did 
control participants (MST =.303, SEST = .003, MControl = .033, SEControl = .001), F(1, 58) = 
21.391, p < .001. Likewise, participants in the ST group reported a higher proportion of 
reactive TRI than did control participants (MST =.224, SEST = .028, MControl = .103, SEControl 
= .019), F(1, 58) = 8.020, p = .006. This finding suggests that participants who 
experienced heightened stereotype threat not only engage in increased worry-laden 
monitoring of performance, but also experience increased mind-wandering about task 
strategy. Participants in the control group were also more likely to report being on-task 
than stereotype threat participants (MST = 3.70, SEST = .402, MControl = 4.83, SEControl = 
.462), however this difference was not significant F(1, 58) = 3.74, p = .058. Likewise, our 
two groups were not significantly different in terms of reported TUT F(1, 59) = .093, p = 
.761
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Figure 2. Pilot Study 1 Mind-Wandering Proportions for Stereotype Threat Primed and Control Groups. 
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Figure 3. Pilot Study 1 TRI Subtypes for Stereotype Threat Primed and Control Groups. 
 
 
OSPAN math verification accuracy was compared in the two groups (see Figure 
4). Contrary to our initial hypothesis, a main effect of group was not found for math 
verification accuracy, F(1, 59) = 1.801, p = .185. The stereotype threat and control 
groups did equally well on the math verification portion of the OSPAN (MST = 90.93, 
SEST = .73, MControl = 91.70, SEControl = .74). A main effect of group was not found for 
letter recall accuracy, F(1, 59) = 1.01, p = .276. Participants in two groups did equally 
well on the letter recall portion of the OSPAN (MST = 87.05, SEST = .64, MControl = 88.10, 
SEControl = .72). It is possible that our OSPAN task, which used set sizes of two and three, 
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was not difficult enough to lead to performance deficits in our stereotype threat group. 
Therefore, we conducted Pilot Experiment 2, which used a more challenging OSPAN 
task. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Pilot Study 1 OSPAN Math Verification and Letter Recall Accuracy for Stereotype Threat 
Primed and Control Groups.  
 
In the current study, participants in the stereotype threat group did not appear to 
suffer in terms of math performance although they did report more TRI than participants 
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in the control group. Because the stereotype threat primed group did not show the 
expected performance deficits, we were unable to examine mediating effects of anxiety, 
mood, and motivation on task performance in those under stereotype threat. Indeed, we 
found no main effects of group for self-reported anxiety, F(1,59) = 1.0, p = .31, self-
reported positive affect, F(1,59) = 1.3, p = .26, self-reported negative affect, F(1,59) = 
0.46, p = .27, and self-reported motivation, F(1,59) = 0.07, p = .78. Again, it is possible 
that the OSPAN we used was not challenging enough to alter mood, motivation, or 
anxiety in the ST primed participants.  
Pilot Experiment 2 
We predicted that the stereotype threat group would be less accurate on the math 
verification portion of the OSPAN. This was not the case. Participants in both groups 
achieved a high level of performance on the math verification task, and it is possible that 
the version of the OSPAN used in Pilot Experiment 2 was not challenging enough to lead 
to performance deficits in the group primed for math-related stereotype threat. We 
therefore conducted an additional pilot experiment in which we made the math 
verification portion of the OSPAN more difficult task by increasing the set sizes from 
two and three math problems to be verified in a OSPAN trial to three, four, and five math 
problems to be verified to see if stereotype threat driven performance deficits would 
result.  
We conducted the same analyses as in Pilot Experiment 1 and predicted that those 
in the stereotype threat group would be slower to pair the concept of “female” and 
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“mathematics” together during the IAT, would report increased TRI, and would have 
lower accuracy on the math portion of the OSPAN. We expected that the stereotype 
threat primed group would report more anxiety and negative affect than the control 
group. Furthermore, we hypothesized that anxiety and negative affect would mediate the 
relationship between stereotype threat activation (as indicated by scores on the math-
gender IAT) and OSPAN math verification accuracy.  
Methods 
Pilot Experiment 2 was identical to Pilot Experiment 1 with the exception of the 
OSPAN task used.  The OSPAN used in Pilot Experiment 2 consisted of 81 trials with set 
size varying between three, four, and five math problems to be verified and letters to be 
recalled. During the OSPAN, participants were presented with nine thought probes, 
occurring at unpredictable intervals, which asked them to indicate the type of thought 
they had experienced just prior to the appearance of the probe. Participants then 
completed the same post-task questionnaires that were used in Pilot Experiment 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Analysis of IAT scores, probe-caught mind-wandering episodes, and math 
accuracy in the ST and control groups were conducted using one-way ANOVAs. While 
participants in the ST primed group were slower to pair the concepts of “math” and 
“female” together and “male” and “liberal arts” together (perhaps indicating heightened 
math-related stereotype threat in ST primed participant) there was no significant group 
difference (MST = -0.23, SEST = 0.07, MControl = 0.01, SEControl = 0.05) in IAT scores, F(1, 
58) = 7.374, p = .009.
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Figure 5. Pilot Study 2 Response Latencies (ms) for Compatible and Incompatible IAT Trials by Group.  
 
Proportions of probe-caught mind-wandering were compared for our two groups 
(see Figure 6). We found a main effect of group on TRI, F(1,58) = 5.488, p = .002. As in 
Pilot Experiment 1, participants in the stereotype threat group indicated experiencing 
more task-related interference on thought probes during the OSPAN (MST = 1.60, SEST 
=.31, MControl = 0.73, SEControl =.45). Again, we believe that the stereotype threat priming 
procedure led to increased worry-laden monitoring of performance in our stereotype 
threat group, which is reflected in increased TRI. Participants in the ST group reported a 
higher proportion of proactive TRI than did control participants (MST =.060, SEST = .016, 
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MControl = .030, SEControl = .009), F(1, 58) = 3.579, p = .063. Likewise, participants in the 
ST group reported a higher proportion of reactive TRI than did control participants (MST 
=.090, SEST = .012, MControl = .046, SEControl = .013), F(1, 58) = 3.512, p = .065. This 
finding suggests that participants who experienced heightened stereotype threat not only 
engage in increased worry-laden monitoring of performance, but also experience 
increased mind-wandering about task strategy.  
Participants in the control group were also more likely to report being on-task 
than stereotype threat participants (MST = 3.47, SEST = .53, MControl = 5.37, SEControl = .33), 
with this difference being significant, F(1,58) = 2.267, p = .006. However, these two 
groups were not significantly different in terms of reported TUT F(1,58) = 2.267, p = 
.138.   
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Figure 6. Pilot Study 2 Mind-Wandering Proportions for Stereotype Threat Primed and Control 
Groups.
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Figure 7.  Pilot Study 2 TRI Subtypes for Stereotype Threat Primed and Control 
Groups. 
 
OSPAN math verification accuracy was compared in the two groups (see Figure 
8). Using a more challenging version of the OSPAN with larger set sizes, a main effect of 
group was found for math verification accuracy, F(1, 58) = 12.11, p = .001. Participants 
in the control group did better on the math verification portion of the OSPAN (MST = 
90.60, SEST = .92, MControl = 94.11, SEControl = .42) than participants primed for stereotype 
threat, potentially because they experienced fewer off-task thoughts. There was no group 
difference in letter recall accuracy, F(1,58) = .268, p = .790. Participants in both groups 
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did equally well on the letter recall portion of the OSPAN (MST = 88.21, SEST = .80, 
MControl = 89.62, SEControl = .32). 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Pilot Study 2 OSPAN Math Verification and Letter Recall Accuracy for Stereotype 
Threat Primed and Control Groups.  
 
In the current study, participants in the stereotype threat group did appear to suffer 
in terms of math performance. Additionally, these participants also reported more TRI 
than participants in the control group. Next, we examined which factors correlate mind-
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wandering and task performance. Overall, like in Pilot Experiment 1, we found no main 
effects of group for self-reported anxiety, F(1, 59) = 1.0, p = .31, self-reported positive 
affect, F(1, 59) = 1.3, p = .26, self-reported negative affect, F(1, 59) = 0.46, p = .27, and 
self-reported motivation, F(1, 59) = 0.07, p = .78.  
Like Mrazek and colleagues (2011), we found that stereotype threat priming 
altered mind-wandering patterns in female young adults. More specifically, we found 
using our thought probe methodology that stereotype threat primed participants 
specifically reported more TRI than controls. Unlike the ST primed young adults in 
Mrazek and colleagues’ study, the ST primed young adults in our pilot experiments did 
not report increased anxiety. Mrazek et al. (2011) used a challenging math task that 
consisted of quantitative questions from the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) 
whereas we used a modified OSPAN task as our mind-wandering task within the 
stereotyped domain. The OSPAN math verification problems were relatively easy, and it 
is possible that our math task was not challenging enough to increase anxiety in our 
participants.   
Aims of the Aging Study 
In Pilot Experiments 1 and 2 we primed cognitive concerns within younger adults 
and subsequently found that they reported more task-related interference than is typical in 
younger adults. In the aging study, we predicted that older adults relieved of stereotype 
threat will report significantly less TRI than both a control older adult group and a group 
 
  36   
primed for stereotype threat above and beyond what may already be elicited by the 
normal laboratory environment.  
An additional goal of the proposed study is to examine the roles that affect, 
anxiety, motivation, and importance of stereotyped domain play in mediating 
relationships between stereotype threat and mind-wandering and between stereotype 
threat and performance within the stereotyped domain. Affect, anxiety, and motivation 
will be assessed in the proposed aging study using the same questionnaires used in the 
previously described gender and stereotype threat study. Importance of achievement in 
the domain of memory will be assessed using the Achievement subscale of the 
Metamemory in Adulthood Questionnaire (MIA-Ach; Dixon & Hultsch, 1984). 
Participants will also complete portions of the Thinking Content, Task Interest and 
Motivation subscales of the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews et al., 
1999, 2002). We will measure mind-wandering using both online thought probes and 
retrospective questionnaires to compare mind-wandering reported using these two 
different methods.   
Furthermore, the specific content of older adults’ elevated TRI remains unknown. 
Task-related interference may reflect a reactive form of mind-wandering or a more 
proactive form of mind-wandering (a form of mind-wandering that may have positive 
consequences). Understanding the cause and the content of older adults’ elevated TRI 
will extend perspectives on metacognitive monitoring in older adults (Hertzog & Hultsch, 
2000).
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CHAPTER III 
AGING STUDY METHODS 
Methods 
 
Participants 
Thirty younger adults aged 18-22 (M = 19.20, SD = 1.16) and 90 older adults 
aged 60-75 (M = 67.51, SD = 3.89) participated in the study. Younger adults were 
recruited through the UNCG Experimetrix subject pool and received course credit. Older 
adults were recruited through the UNCG Adult Cognition Laboratory database of older 
adult community volunteers and received $20 (approximately $10 per hour) for 
participation. Older adult participants were screened for health issues such as vision 
problems, past seizures or strokes, and severe arthritis that would make it difficult to use 
a pencil or computer keyboard for a long period of time prior to being scheduled for the 
study. Participants all had corrected near visual acuity of 20/50 or better. Participation 
took approximately one and one half hours for younger adults and two hours for older 
adults.  
Participants completed a computerized demographics questionnaire (Appendix 
H), followed by the Lighthouse Near Visual Acuity Test (Bailey, 1987; see Appendix I), 
a paper-and-pencil measure of processing speed (Pattern Comparison; Salthouse, 1993; 
see Appendix K), and a computerized vocabulary test (Ekstrom et al., 1976; see 
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Appendix J). The vocabulary task served as a rough measure of crystallized intelligence. 
Demographics and pretest data is found in Table 1 below. As is typically obtained, there 
were group differences in education (F (3,116) = 19.845, p <.001), with the older adults 
in each of the three OA sample having obtained more years of education than younger 
adults (p < .05 for all t-test focused comparisons). There were also group differences in 
processing speed (F (3,116) = 3.217, p .025), with younger adults scoring higher on the 
measure of processing speed than did older adults in all three OA groups (p < .05 for all 
t-test focused comparisons). Finally, as typically found, there were group differences in 
number of medications taken (F (3,116) = 4.273, p .007), with older adults in all three 
groups reporting taking more medications than younger adults (p < .05 for all t-test 
focused comparisons). However, there were no differences within the older adult sample 
in vocabulary, processing speed, age, and number of medications taken (p > .05 for all t-
test focused comparisons).
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Table 1  
 
Aging Study Demographics and Pretest Data. 
 
 Younger Adult OA Control OA ST Relief OA ST Primed 
N 30 30 30 30 
 M SE M SE M SE M SE 
Processing Speed  35.83 1.34 33.40 1.56 31.30 1.20 30.53 1.18 
Vocabulary   13.73 .66 23.37 1.18 24.20 1.22 23.03 1.25 
Age   19.20 .21 66.52 .69 67.90 .69 68.11 .86 
Education  12.80 .22 16.74 .37 16.07 .53 15.48 .63 
Medications  .87 .18 2.15 .24 2.07 .38 1.70 .33 
 
Note.  Processing speed = number correct on out of 40 on Salthouse’s pattern comparison task (1993); Vocabulary = number correct out of 
36 on the Advanced Vocabulary Test (Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976); Education = total years of education; Medications = total 
number of medications prescribed.  
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Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of up to six people and the older adult groups 
were randomized into either control, ST primed, or ST relief conditions. The stereotype 
threat manipulations were carried out using brief, newspaper-style reports constructed by 
Hess et al. (2003). Participants in the ST primed group read two reports that focused on 
how age-related decline is biologically-based and inevitable (see Appendix L). 
Participants in the ST relief group read two reports that focused on how the age-related 
decline that does typically occur is not inevitable, but is dependent on a range of social 
and environmental factors (see Appendix M). An additional research report was 
constructed that served as a control reading, which was given to both younger and older 
adult control participants (see Appendix N). Participants were given a few minutes to 
read the brief reports and were then asked to provide a rating on a scale of 1 to 5 of how 
easy they found it to understand that reading (1 = Very difficult to understand, 5 = Very 
easy to understand).  
A computerized version of the age-attitudes Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) was completed next and was used as a 
manipulation check for the stereotype threat priming procedure. Stimuli consisted of 
pleasant (e.g. “happy”) and unpleasant (e.g. “boring”) words, along with pictures of old 
and young faces (see Appendix R). Participants first completed a practice trial in which 
they sorted the word stimuli into their appropriate categories, followed by a practice trial 
in which they sorted the pictures of old and young faces into their appropriate categories.  
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Next, participants completed two “critical blocks”. One of these critical blocks 
consisted of 20 “congruent” trials in which participants were asked to pair pictures of old 
adult faces with unpleasant words. The other critical block consisted of 20 “incongruent” 
trials in which participants were asked to pair pictures of old adult faces with pleasant 
words. A third practice block was completed next, during which participants practiced a 
different key assignment. Finally, two more “critical blocks” were completed, again 
consisting of 20 incongruent and 20 congruent trials. Therefore, the participants 
completed a total of 80 critical trials during which their response times were recorded. 
The order of congruent and incongruent critical blocks was counterbalanced between 
participants.  
Next, participants completed the automated Operation Span Task (OSPAN). As in 
the pilot experiments, the OSPAN was used as the task during which mind-wandering 
was measured. For this study, we used the same version of the OSPAN that was used in 
Pilot Experiment 2, with set sizes varying between three, four, and five. Mind-wandering 
was assessed in the same way as in Pilot Experiments 1 and 2. Participants responded to a 
total of 9 thought probes that appeared at unpredictable intervals during the OSPAN. This 
study used the same probe placement as Pilot Experiment 2. The OSPAN was framed as 
a memory task for the ST primed group and was framed as a mathematical task in the ST 
relief and the control conditions. These instructions served as an additional ST 
manipulation. Participants practiced the math verification portion of the task, the letter 
recall portion of the task, and both the math verification and letter recall portions together
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before data collection actually began. During the task, participants received feedback 
regarding their trial-level letter recall accuracy, their trial-level math verification 
accuracy, and their cumulative math verification accuracy. 
Finally, a variety of computerized post-task questionnaires were administered to 
participants. As in Pilot Experiments 1 and 2, participants completed the Dundee Stress 
State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews et al., 1999; see Appendix F), the achievement, 
anxiety, and locus of control subscales of the Metamemory in Adulthood questionnaire 
(MIA; Dixon & Hultsch, 1984; see Appendix E), the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegan, 1988; see Appendix D) and several additional 
Likert-scale questions about perceived task difficulty, task focus, fatigue, and stress.
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CHAPTER IV 
AGING STUDY RESULTS 
IAT Results 
For the age-attitudes IAT, IAT scores (D) can range from -2 (signifying a strong 
implicit bias in favor of older adults) to +2 (signifying a strong implicit bias in favor of 
younger adults). A one-way ANOVA on participant IAT scores did not reveal an effect 
of condition, F (3,114) = .380, p= .767. As evidenced by the data below in Figure 7, both 
younger adults and participants in all three of the older adult groups showed similar 
biases towards pairing young faces with pleasant words. One possible reason for the lack 
IAT group differences will be considered in the Discussion section
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Figure 9. Mean Age-Attitudes IAT Scores by Condition. 
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Mind-Wandering Variables 1 
For proportion of on-task thoughts, we predicted that younger adults would report 
being on-task significantly less than our older adult control participants. However, a one-
way ANOVA on overall proportion of OT thought reports revealed no significant effect 
of condition, F (3,116) = 1.615, p =.190. Each of the four groups reported comparable 
proportions of on-task thoughts (Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean Proportion On-Task Thoughts by Condition. 
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We predicted that younger adults would report a significantly higher proportion of 
TUTs than all of our older adult participants. As we expected, a one-way ANOVA for 
proportion of TUTs, revealed a significant effect of condition, F (3,116) = 4.856, p 
=.003.Younger adults reported a higher proportion of TUTs compared to all three of the 
older adult groups (p< .05 for all t-test focused comparisons) (Figure 11). While younger 
adults reported more TUTs than older adults in each group (p > .05 for all t-test focused 
comparisons), there were no differences in mean proportion of TUTs between the OA 
control, OA ST relief, and OA ST prime groups (p > .05 for all t-test focused 
comparisons).  
 
 
Figure 11. Mean Proportion of Task-Unrelated Thoughts by Condition.
 
  47   
We predicted that older adults primed for stereotype threat would report 
significantly more TRI than both older adults relieved of stereotype threat and younger 
adults. A one-way ANOVA for proportion of thought probes where TRI was indicated 
did reveal a significant effect of condition, F (3,116) = 5.201, p =.002. As predicted, 
older adults primed for ST reported a higher proportion of task-related interference than 
did younger adults (t(58) = -3.362, p = .001) and older adults relieved of ST (t(58) = -
2.694, p = .009).  
 
 
Figure 12. Mean Proportion of Task-Related Interference by Condition.   
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Prior to conducting our analyses, we made no predictions about which group 
would report the highest mean proportion of proactive TRI. However, based on work 
conducted on stereotype threat and worry-laden performance monitoring, we did predict 
that older adults primed for stereotype threat would report the highest mean proportion of 
reactive TRI. There was a significant effect of condition for mean proportion of proactive 
TRI, F (3,116) = 3.097, p =.030 with ST prime older adults reporting significantly more 
proactive TRI than both younger adults (t(58) = -2.312, p < .001). The difference in 
proactive TRI between ST prime older adults and ST relief older adults was trending 
(t(58) = -1.978, p = .053). 
 
  
Figure 13. Mean Proportion of Proactive Task-Related Interference by Condition.  
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A significant effect of condition for mean proportion of reactive TRI was also 
found, F (3,116) = 2.702, p =.049, with older adults primed for ST reporting a higher 
proportion of evaluative TRI than did younger adults (Figure 14), t(58) = -2.719, p = 
.009. Therefore, older adults primed for memory-related stereotype threat did not only 
report the most TRI overall, but they also reported the most TRI regarding task strategy 
and the most TRI regarding performance monitoring. 
 
 
Figure 14. Mean Proportion of Reactive Task-Related Interference by Condition.  
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Operation Span Performance 2 
For the OSPAN, math verification accuracy and letter recall accuracy were 
calculated for each participant. Mean math verification and mean letter recall accuracies 
were then calculated for each group. We predicted that younger adults would be more 
accurate on both components of the OSPAN than would the older adult participants. 
Within the older adult sample, we predicted that older adults primed for ST would have 
the lowest letter recall accuracy and OA relieved of ST would have the highest letter 
recall accuracy. Because our stereotype threat manipulations were focused on memory-
related stereotype threat, and because there does not seem to be a wide-spread stereotype 
regarding cognitive decline and mathematical ability, we made no predictions regarding 
ST condition and math verification accuracy within the sample of older adults.  
A main effect of condition was found for math verification accuracy, F (3,116) = 
2.910, p =.038, with younger adults obtaining higher accuracy on the math verification 
portion of the OSPAN than did the OA ST prime group, t(58) = 2.327, p = .024, which 
had the lowest math verification accuracy of the four groups. Math verification accuracy 
did not differ within the older adult sample (all p values >.05 for the t-test focused 
comparisons). More importantly, a main effect of condition was found for letter recall 
accuracy, F (3,116) = 3.226, p =.025. As predicted, older adults in the ST prime 
condition had lower letter recall accuracy than both younger adults (t(58) = 2.704, p = 
.009) and the older adults who were relieved of memory-related ST (t(58) = 2.391, p 
=.020). 
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`  
Figure 15. Mean OSPAN Math Verification Accuracy by Condition.   
 
 
Figure 16. Mean OSPAN Letter Recall Accuracy by Condition.   
 
  52   
Influences on Mind-Wandering and Performance 3 
A variety of post-task questionnaires were administered in order to gain a better 
understanding of which factors influence mind-wandering and OSPAN performance in 
younger and older adults. Possible contributing factors include mood, self-rated stress, 
and anxiety, perceived task difficulty, self-rated focus on the OSPAN task, interest in the 
task, and motivation to do well in the task. Two retrospective mind-wandering 
questionnaires (the TUT and TRI subscales of the DSSQ) were also administered to see if 
scores on retrospective mind-wandering reports correlated with instances of online, 
probe-caught mind-wandering. In this study, an additional scale of the DSSQ designed to 
measure self-consciousness or self-focused attention was included, as it is possible that 
older adults under ST would have more interfering thoughts regarding the self as it relates 
to task performance. The overall correlations between the mind-wandering and 
performance variables and the post-task questionnaire variables are presented below in 
Table 2 below. Correlations for the younger adult group can be found in Appendix S. The 
correlations collapsed across the three OA groups can be found in Appendix T. Finally, 
the correlations for the OA control group, OA ST relief group, and OA ST primed group 
can be found in Appendices U, V, and W, respectively.
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Table 2 
 
Overall Correlations for Mind-Wandering and OSPAN Variables. 
 
 TUT Overall 
TRI 
Reactive 
TRI 
Proactive 
TRI 
On-task Recall 
accuracy 
Math 
accuracy 
PTQ Task 
Difficulty 
-.164 
 
.236* .131 .212* -.067 -.284** -.203* 
PTQ Recall 
Difficulty 
-.096 .291** .128 .336** -.172 -.279** .064 
PTQ Math 
Difficulty 
-.105 .176 .211* .031 -.063 -.198* -.455** 
PTQ Effort -.400** .145 .079 .134 .175 -.040 .135 
PTQ Fatigue .063 .018 .033 .008 -.068 -.206* -.012 
PTQ Stress -.005 .197* .157 .152 -.162 -.202* .009 
PTQ Task 
Interest 
.321** -.218* -.155 -.174 -.049 .036 .091 
PTQ 
Distraction  
.500** -.062 .053 -.185* -.301** -.080 -.057 
PTQ Recall 
Focus 
-.238** -.050 -.071 .023 .209* .367** .194* 
PTQ Math 
Focus 
-.221* .054 -.007 .122 .102 .083 .112 
DSSQ TUT .416** .052 .096 -.030 -.340** -.027 -.070 
DSSQ TRI -.060 .347** .324** .173 -.247** -.119 -.063 
DSSQ 
Motivation 
.311** -.205* -.165 -.162 -.050 .053 -.120 
DSSQ SFA 
MIA Anxiety 
-.032 
.031 
.324** 
.155 
.169 
.142 
.293** 
.021 
-.233* 
-.129 
-.116 
-.116 
-.167 
.023 
MIA Achieve -.215* .220* .168 .185* -.039 -.120 -.002 
MIA Locus -.214* .058 .023 .037 .128 -.188* -.051 
PANAS Pos -.305** .128 .052 .175 .104 -.045 -.013 
Cage -.349** .210* .195* .135 .059 -.109 -.213* 
  
Note. Explanations of all PTQ variables are given in Table 4; Explanations of all DSSQ variables are given 
in Table 5; Explanations of MIA and PANAS variables is given in Table 3; Cage = Chronological age in 
year; * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
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Probe-Caught and Retrospective Mind-Wandering  
Scores on the TRI subscale of the DSSQ did not differ by condition, F (3,113) = 
1.646, p =.183. Although scores on the TRI subscale of the DSSQ did not differ by 
condition, DSSQ TRI did correlate overall with probe caught proportion of TRI (r = 
.416**). Breaking down this correlation by group revealed a significant correlation in the 
older adult control (r = .392*) and older adult ST prime (r = .562**) groups, but not the 
younger adult (r = .294) and older adult ST relief (r = .100) groups. As DSSQ-TRI scores 
increased, do did proportion of reactive TRI in these two older adult groups. Scores on 
the TUT subscale of the DSSQ did differ by condition, F (3,113) = 5.753, p = .001. 
Participants in the younger adult group had significantly higher scores of the DSSQ TUT 
scale than did participants in all three OA groups (all p values < .05 for t-test focused 
comparisons). DSSQ TUT did correlate overall with probe caught (r = .416**). Breaking 
down this correlation by group revealed that this correlation was significant in the YA 
group (r = .407*), the OA control group (r = .425**), and the OA ST relief group (r = 
.476**), but not in the OA ST primed group (r = -.013).  
Mood and Mind-Wandering  
Positive and negative affect was assessed using the PANAS. For positive affect 
scores, there was a main effect of condition, F (3,113) = 12.035, p < .001. Younger adults 
reported lower positive affect than did older adult controls (t(57)= -4.227, p <.001), older 
adults relieved of ST (t(57)= -4.678, p <.001), and older adults primed of ST (t(57) = -
4.208, p <.001). There were no differences in positive affect between the three older adult 
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groups (all p values > .05 for t-test focused comparisons). There were no differences in 
negative affect between the different conditions (F (3,113) = 1.979, p = .121). The 
descriptive data for the PANAS are contained below in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
 
PANAS and MIA Descriptive Statistics. 
 
 Younger Adult OA Control OA ST Relief OA ST Primed 
N 30 29 29 29 
 M SE M SE M SE M SE 
PANAS Positive  26.57 1.65 35.31 1.22 36.55 7.21 34.59 .91 
PANAS Negative  15.77 .58 14.03 .84 13.48 1.03 13.31 .71 
MIA Achievement   53.67 1.50 52.55 .98 53.62 .95 53.41 .95 
MIA Anxiety 40.77 1.48 35.45 1.64 35.07 1.07 38.93 1.48 
MIA Locus of Control 26.03 .53 26.14 .42 25.52 .55 26.00 .51 
 
Note.  PANAS Positive = score out of 50 for the positive mood scale of the PANAS where higher scores indicate greater positive mood; PANAS 
Negative = score out of 50 for the negative mood scale of the PANAS where greater scores indicate greater negative mood; MIA Achievement = score 
out of 75 for the Achievement scale of the MIA where higher scores indicate higher importance placed on personal memory achievement; MIA Anxiety 
= score out of 65 for the Anxiety scale of the MIA where higher scores indicate more anxiety; MIA Locus of Control = score out of 40 for the Locus 
scale of the MIA where higher scores indicate more internal locus of control for memory ability .  
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We hypothesized that, as negative mood increased or positive mood decreased, 
the proportion of on-task thoughts would decrease in each conditions and the proportion 
of task-related interference (particularly reactive TRI) would increase in the older adult 
ST primed group. As negative mood increased, so did reactive TRI, but only within the 
OA control group (r =.383*). Likewise, as self-rated stress increased (as measured by our 
single-item post-task question), so did proportion of overall TRI, but only in the control 
older adults (r = .481**). We did not observe any significant correlation between mood, 
positive or negative, and any type of TRI within the older adult groups. Reactive TRI also 
positively correlated with self-reported stress in older adult controls (r =.377*), but not in 
the OA ST relief group (r = -.033) or the OA ST primed group (r = .152).   
Task Difficulty and Mind-Wandering  
The descriptive data for the various post-task questions are contained in Table 4 
below. Self-rated difficulty for the OSPAN did not differ for the math verification, F 
(3,113) = .377, p = .770, the letter recall portion, F (3,113) = 1.106, p =.350, or the task 
overall, F (3,113) =1.992, p =.119. Although these ratings did not differ by group, self-
rated OSPAN difficulty did correlate with some mind-wandering variables. Self-rated 
task difficulty was overall correlated with TRI (r = .236**). Breaking down this 
correlation by group revealed that this correlation was trending in older adults controls (r 
= .344, p = .064) and older adults primed for ST (r = .366, p = .051). In OA controls 
proactive TRI was significantly correlated with self-rated task difficulty (r = .411**). 
Self-rated task difficulty and TRI were not significantly correlated in younger adults (r =
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.214) and older adults relieved of ST (r = -.303). Self-rated letter recall difficulty was 
also overall positively correlated with TRI (r = .291**). More specifically, this 
correlation was significant in younger adults (r = .368*) and was trending in the OA ST 
primed group (r = .344, p = .068). In YAs and OA ST primed participants, reactive TRI 
in particular was correlated with self-rated recall difficulty (r = .431** and r = .444*, 
respectively). 
Task Engagement and Mind-Wandering  
Self-rated focus on the math verification portion of the OSPAN differed by 
condition, F (3,113) = 3.326, p =.022, with younger adults indicating that they placed 
more focus on the math verification portion of the OSPAN than did the OA control group 
(t(57) = 3.219, p = .002) and the OA ST primed group (t(57) = 2.017, p = .048). Self-
rated focus on the letter recall portion of the OSPAN did not differ by condition, F 
(3,113) =2.381, p =.073.  
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Table 4 
 
Post-Task Questions Descriptive Statistics. 
 
 Younger Adult OA Control OA ST Relief OA ST Primed 
N 30 29 29 29 
 M SE M SE M SE M SE 
PTQ Overall Task 
Difficulty 
2.37 .19 2.76 .18 2.62 .21 3.00 .93 
PTQ Math Difficulty  2.23 .21 2.21 .17 2.48 .21 2.38 .24 
PTQ Recall Difficulty  2.80 .19 2.93 .23 2.62 .90 3.14 .23 
PTQ Task Performance 4.07 .13 3.76 .15 3.86 .16 3.66 .15 
PTQ Satisfaction 2.23 .21 2.59 .18 2.34 .15 2.69 .19 
PTQ Effort  3.80 .21 4.31 .20 4.45 .15 4.28 .20 
PTQ Better Performance 2.63 .25 3.28 .28 3.66 .26 3.45 .21 
PTQ Task Interest  3.00 .17 1.62 .14 1.69 .16 1.83 .15 
PTQ Fatigue  3.70 .19 2.79 .22 2.66 .19 3.10 .22 
PTQ Stress 2.73 .23 2.28 .24 2.69 .21 2.48 .20 
PTQ Distraction 2.50 .23 1.48 .15 1.90 .18 1.66 .16 
PTQ Recall Focus 3.93 .19 4.52 .14 4.52 .18 4.34 .21 
PTQ Math Focus 3.70 .17 4.41 .78 3.97 .94 4.21 .19 
PTQ Reading Interest 2.40 .15 3.03 .18 3.79 .22 3.45 .17 
PTQ Stereotype Belief  3.33 .22 3.79 .17 4.10 .20 4.34 .17 
 
Note.  All responses to the post-task questions above were made on a 1 to 5 Likert scale. PTQ Overall Task Difficulty = perceived overall OSPAN 
difficulty where 1 = Not at all difficulty and 5 = Very difficult. PTQ Math Difficulty = perceived OSPAN math verification difficulty where 1 = Not at 
all difficulty and 5 = Very difficult. PTQ Recall Difficulty = perceived OSPAN letter recall difficulty where 1 = Not at all difficulty and 5 = Very 
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difficult. PTQ Task Performance = how well participant thought they did overall on the OSPAN where 1 = Very poorly and 5 = Very well. PTQ 
Satisfaction = how satisfied participant was with performance where 1 = Not at all satisfied and 5 = Very satisfied. PTQ Effort = how much effort the 
participant thought they put into the OSPAN where 1 = No effort at all and 5 = Very high effort. PTQ Better Performance = the degree to which the 
participant thought they could have done better on the OSPAN where 1 = Not at all better and 5 = Very much better. PTQ Task Interest = how 
interesting the participant thought the OSPAN was where 1 = Not at all interesting and 5 = Very interesting. PTQ Fatigue = how fatiguing participants 
thought the OSPAN was where 1 = Not at all fatiguing and 5 = Very fatiguing. PTQ Stress = the degree to which participants felt during the OSPAN 
where 1 = Not at all felt stress and 5 = Very much felt stress. PTQ Distraction = how distracted participants thought they were during the OSPAN was 
where 1 = Not at all distracted and 5 = Very distracted. PTQ Recall Focus = how focused participants were on the letter recall portion of the OSPAN 
was where 1 = Not at all focused and 5 = Very focused. PTQ Math Focus = how focused participants were on the math verification portion of the 
OSPAN was where 1 = Not at all focused and 5 = Very focused. PTQ Reading Interest = how interesting participants found the ST manipulation 
newspaper reports where 1 = Not at all interesting and 5 = Very interesting. PTQ Stereotype Belief = how much participants believe that there is a 
negative stereotype about aging and memory where 1 = do not at all believe that there is a stereotype and 5 = Very much believe that there is a 
stereotype. 
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As self-rated focus on the recall portion of the OSPAN increased, proportion of 
TRI tended to decrease in the OA control participants (r = -.556*), but not in the OA ST 
relief (r = .251) and OA ST primed participants (r = -.170). As recall difficulty increased 
so did proportion of proactive TRI in younger adults and OA ST primed participants (r = 
.431* and r = .444*, respectively). Self-rated effort to do well on the OSPAN did not 
differ by condition, F (3,110) =2.231, p = .089. Self-rated effort was overall correlated 
with proportion of TUTs (r = -.400**). As self-rated effort increased, proportion of 
probe-caught TUTs decreased in younger adults (r = -.492*) and in older adult controls 
(r = -.503*).  
Motivation to do well, as measured by the DSSQ Motivation subscale, differed by 
condition, F (3,113) =3.243, p = .025. Surprisingly, younger adults had higher motivation 
scores than OA controls (t(57) = 2.436, p = .018) and OAs primed for ST (t(57) = 2.342, 
p = .023).  Overall, DSSQ Motivation was correlated with both proportion of TRI (r = -
.205*) and proportion of TUTs (r = .311**).  Task interest, as measured by the DSSQ 
Interest subscale, also differed by condition, F (3,113) =2.813, p =.043. Younger adults 
reported higher task interest as measured by the DSSQ than participants in all OA groups 
(all p values < .001 for t-test focused comparisons). Although DSSQ interest differed by 
condition, it did not correlate significantly with mind-wandering variables or OSPAN 
performance variables.  
Interest in the OSPAN task as measured by the single-item PTQ question also 
differed by condition, F (3,113) =17.895, p < .001. Participants in the younger adult 
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group gave higher PTQ Task Interest ratings than did older adults in all three OA groups 
(p values < .001 for all t-test focused comparisons). PTQ Task Interest did correlate with 
mind-wandering variables. Overall, PTQ Task Interest positively correlated with probe 
caught TUT (r = .321**) and negatively correlated with probe-caught TRI (r = -.218*). 
Breaking down the correlation by group, the positive correlation between PTQ Task 
Interest and probe caught TUT was present in OA controls (r = .414**), but not in 
younger adults (r = .016), OAs relieved of ST (r = .367), and OAs primed for ST (r = 
.030). Breaking down the correlation between PTQ Task Interest and probe caught TRI 
by group, the negative correlation between PTQ Task Interest and probe caught TUT was 
present in younger adults (r = -.497**), but not in OA controls (r = -.047), OAs relieved 
of ST (r = -.111), and OAs  primed for ST (r = -.051).    
The PTQ Effort item asked participants to rate how much effort they put into the 
OSPAN portion of the study. There was not a significant effect of group for PTQ Effort, 
F (3,113) =2.231, p = .089, but PTQ Effort did correlate with mind-wandering variables. 
Overall, PTQ Effort was negatively correlated with probe caught TUT (r = -.400**). 
Breaking this correlation down by group, PTQ Effort was negatively correlated with 
probe caught TUT in the YA group (r = -.492**) and OA control group (r = -.503**), but 
not in the OA ST relief (r = .104) or ST prime groups (r = -.323).  
The PTQ Distraction item asked participants to rate how distracted they were 
during the OSPAN and there were group differences for these ratings, F (3,113) =6.018, 
p = .001. Younger adults have higher ratings for PTQ Distraction than did OA controls 
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and OAs in the ST relief group (p values > .05 for t-test focused comparisons), but notthe 
participants in the OA ST primed group (p > .05). The PTQ Distraction ratings did  not 
differ between the different OA groups (all p values > .05). PTQ Distraction was 
positively correlated with probe caught TRI overall (r = .500**). This positive correlation 
was found in the YA (r = .627**) and OA control (r = .503**) group, but not in the ST 
relief (r = .316) and ST prime OA (r = .144) groups. PTQ Distraction was overall 
negatively correlated with proactive TRI (r = -.185*) but they were not significantly 
correlated in any of the individual groups (all p values < .01).  
Self-Focused Attention and Mind-Wandering  
Self-consciousness, as measured by the self-focused attention subscale of the 
DSSQ, differed by condition, F (3,113) = 2.990, p = .034.Younger adults had higher self-
focused attention scores than did participants in the ST relief condition (t(57) = 2.536, p = 
.014), but the older adult groups did not differ from each other in terms of their DSSQ-
SFA scores (all p values >.05 for the t-test focused comparisons). Descriptive data for the 
DSSQ scales are presented in Table 5 below. DSSQ-SFA scores were overall positively 
correlated with proportion of TRI (r = .324**). More specifically, proportion TRI and 
DSSQ SFA were significantly correlated in the YA and OA ST prime group (r =.624** 
and .396*, respectively). Reactive TRI was also correlated overall with DSSQ SFA (r = 
.293**). As self-focused attention increased, so did reactive TRI in the both the OA ST 
relief (r = .384*) and prime groups (r =.513**).  
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Table 5 
 
DSSQ Descriptive Statistics. 
 
 Younger Adult OA Control OA ST Relief OA ST Primed 
N 30 29 29 29 
 M SE M SE M SE M SE 
DSSQ TUT 13.07 .99 9.79 .61 9.38 .59 9.90 .57 
DSSQ TRI  20.27 1.17 18.10 .94 18.28 .83 20.52 .99 
DSSQ SFA 15.13 .85 15.31 .83 12.34 .68 14.97 .85 
DSSQ Motivation 21.57 1.30 17.72 .88 19.62 .91 18.10 .68 
DSSQ  Interest  15.97 .63 14.31 .82 13.66 .39 14.79 .39 
         
Note.  DSSQ TUT = score out of 40 for the TUT subscale of the Thinking Content scale where higher scores indicate more task-unrelated thinking; 
DSSQ TRI = number out of 40 for the TRI subscale of the Thinking Content scale where higher scores indicate more task-related interference; DSSQ 
SFA = score out of 40 for the Self-Focused Attention subscale of the Thinking Style scale where higher scores indicate more self-conscious thinking; 
DSSQ Motivation = score out of 35 for the Success Motivation subscale of the Motivation scale where higher scores indicate more motivation to do 
well on the task; DSSQ Interest = score out 35 of for the Intrinsic Motivation subscale of the Motivation scale where higher scores indicate more task 
interest.  
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Memory Anxiety, Achievement, and Locus of Control  
Descriptive statistics for the MIA scales are presented above in Table 2. Anxiety, 
as measured by the anxiety subscale of the MIA, did differ by condition, F(3,113) = 
3.716, p = .014. Younger adults had higher anxiety scores than ST relief participants 
(t(57) = 3.092, p = .003), but anxiety scores did not differ between the three older adult 
groups (all p values >.05 for the t-test focused comparisons). Overall, anxiety did not 
correlate with the mind-wandering and performance variables. Importance of memory 
achievement, as measured by the achievement subscale of the MIA, did not differ by 
condition, F(3,113) = 0.212, p =.888 but did correlate overall with proportion of TRI (r = 
.220*) and proportion of TUTs (r = -.215*). More specifically, importance of memory 
achievement was significantly correlated with proportion of TRI in younger adults (r = 
.391*). Memory-related locus of control, as measured by the locus subscale of the MIA, 
did not differ by condition, F(3,113) = 0.294, p = .830. Overall, locus of control 
correlated with proportion of TUTs (r = -.214*). As internality increased, proportion of 
TUTs increased.   
Other Mind-Wandering Correlates  
Unsurprisingly, as proportion of TUT increased proportion of OT thoughts 
decreased in all groups (r = -577**). Likewise, as proportion TRI increased the 
proportion of OT thoughts decreased (r = -.183*). Overall, proportion of TRI was 
positively and significantly correlated with both proactive (r = .805**) and reactive (r =
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.667**) type of TRI. Perceived fatigue during the OSPAN, as measured by the single 
item PTQ Fatigue question, differed between groups, F(3,113) = 5.070, p = .002. 
Younger adults reported feeling more fatigued during the OSPAN than did older 
adults in all three OA groups (all p values < .05 for t-test focused comparisons). 
Perceived fatigue did not differ between the OA groups (all p values > .05). PTQ Fatigue 
did not correlate significantly with any of the OSPAN performance or mind-wandering 
variables. Perceived stress during the OSPAN, as measured by the single-item PTQ 
Stress question, did not differ between groups, F(3,113) = .897, p = .445. Self-rated stress 
was overall correlated with proportion of TRI (r = .197*). This positive correlation was 
present in OA controls (r = .481**), but not in YAs (r = .348), OA ST relief participants 
(r = -.140), and OA ST primed participants (r = .271). 
We asked two questions regarding ST and our ST priming procedure. The 
Stereotype Belief item asked participants if they believed a negative stereotype existed 
regarding aging and memory ability. For PTQ Stereotype Belief ratings there were 
differences between groups, F(3,113) = 5.186, p = .002. Younger adults were less likely 
to say that a negative stereotype about aging and memory existed than did OAs in the ST 
relief (t(57) = -2.607, p = .012) and ST prime (t(57) = -3.631, p = .001) group, but not the 
OA control group (t(57) = -1.648, p = .105). Older adults in the control group were also 
less likely to say that a negative stereotype about aging and memory existed than did OAs 
in the ST prime group (t(57) = -2.239, p = .029). No other differences in PTQ Stereotype 
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Belief ratings existed between the OA groups (all p values < .05). PTQ Stereotype Belief 
did not correlate overall with any performance or mind-wandering variables.  
PTQ Reading Interest is a single item question asking participants to rate how 
interesting they found the newspaper-style reports used in our ST priming procedure. 
There were group differences for this rating, F(3,113) = 11.087, p < .001. Younger adults 
gave significantly lower interest ratings than did participants in all three OA groups (all p 
values < .05 for focused t-test comparisons). OA control participants also gave 
significantly lower interest ratings than did OAs in the ST relief and ST primed groups 
(all p values < .05 for focused t-test comparisons). The two ST OA groups did not differ 
in their interest ratings (p < .05). PTQ Reading Interest did not correlate overall with any 
performance or mind-wandering variables. 
Letter Recall and Math Verification Accuracy Correlates 
For OA ST prime participants, self-rated stress was negatively correlated with 
recall accuracy (r =-.487**). Proactive TRI was, perhaps surprisingly, negatively 
correlated with recall accuracy (r = -.371*) in OA ST primed participants. Although 
participants primed for stereotype threat engaged in more proactive TRI than any other 
group and therefore experienced increased mind-wandering about task-strategy, they also 
had the worst recall accuracy of all the groups. For OA controls, both overall proportion 
of TRI and proportion of reactive TRI were negatively correlated with recall accuracy (r 
= -.620** and r = -.704**, respectively).   
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CHAPTER V 
AGING STUDY DISCUSSION 
The primary question of this study was whether stereotype threat acts as a mind-
wandering trigger in older adults, and whether stereotype threat particularly leads to 
elevated TRI. In this aging study, we replicated the results of our pilot experiments and 
extended those results to older adults. Older adults primed for memory-related stereotype 
threat reported proportionally more TRI than did both younger adults and older adults 
who were relieved of memory-related stereotype threat.  As predicted by the “Control 
failures x Current concerns” framework (McVay & Kane, 2010a), the degree to which 
one’s current concerns are primed by the context greatly influences if, and how, mind-
wandering occurs. Younger adults coming into the testing environment reported a higher 
proportion of TUTs than did older adults in all groups, most likely because that 
environment primed every day, school-related concerns. In the OA ST primed group and 
possibly the OA control group, the testing environment instead triggered current concerns 
about cognition, resulting instead in increased TRI. Furthermore, the older adults who 
were primed for stereotype threat had significantly worse recall performance than did 
younger adults and older adults primed for stereotype threat.   
We were also interested in qualifying which type of TRI older adults report. Older 
adults have been found to perform as well as younger adults in spite of stereotype threat 
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on some tasks, possibly due to superior emotional control abilities (Phillips, Henry, 
Hosie, & Mihne, 2008; Schiebe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009; Hess, Emory, & Queen, 
2009). However, it was expected that the task demands for the OSPAN would be too high 
to allow emotional control abilities to override negative mood and increased arousal 
triggered by stereotype threat (Blascovitch, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; Croizet et 
al., 2004; Mazerolle, et al., 2012). We therefore expected to see a significant difference in 
the amount of evaluative, reactive TRI reported by older adults in the ST and control 
conditions, with these older adults reporting more reactive TRI. We made no predictions 
regarding differences between the three older adult groups in terms of proactive TRI.  
Our hypotheses regarding overall proportion of TRI and proportion of reactive 
TRI were confirmed. Older adults in the ST relief group reported the lowest proportion of 
TRI, older adults in the ST primed group reported the highest proportion of TRI, and 
control older adults had a mean proportion of TRI that was intermediate between those of 
the other two OA groups, with a mean proportion of TRI higher than that of the ST relief 
group and lower than that of the ST primed group. Therefore, it appears that the normal 
testing environment in the absence of specific ST manipulations is sufficient to at least 
somewhat prime older adults’ performance concerns and, by extension, task-related 
interference. While the proportions of reactive and proactive TRI were roughly 
equivalent within each group, there were between groups differences in the proportion  
of these two subtypes of TRI, with ST primed OAs reporting more of both types of TRI 
than participants in the other groups.
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Older adults in the ST control condition were expected to have lower accuracy on 
the letter recall portion of the OSPAN compared to older adults in the ST relief and 
control conditions, as TRI is associated with performance impairment on tasks that 
require executive control (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2011a; McVay et al., 2012) and 
because performance on a task in the stereotyped domain is expected to suffer in those 
under stereotype threat. The pattern on means for OSPAN letter recall performance was 
as expected, with older adults in the ST relief group demonstrating higher recall accuracy 
than both OA controls and participants in the ST primed group. Participants in the ST 
primed group had the lowest letter recall accuracy of all older adult groups in addition to 
reporting the most task-related interference.  
 We expected older adults in the ST primed condition to report more negative 
affect as measured by the mood component of the PANAS (Popham & Hess, 2013). 
While the younger adult group reported lower mood than all of the older adult groups, no 
group differences in positive or negative affect existed between the OA groups. We also 
expected a positive relationship between increased negative affect and increased mind-
wandering rates, particularly increases in evaluative TRI within the ST primed OA group, 
however we did not find evidence of this relationship. It should be noted that the negative 
scale of the PANAS contain some items about emotions that are extremely negatively 
valenced, and that the emotions are unlikely to be experienced by participants coming 
into a psychology lab to complete a study. For example, it seems unlikely that our 
participants would be feeling “hostile”, “scared”, or even “guilty”.
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We chose to use the PANAS because it is the affect scale that is most widely used 
within the mind-wandering literature. However, we may be more likely to find 
differences between groups or correlations between negative mood and mind-wandering 
variables if we use a measure of negative affect that contained items that were more 
likely to be experienced by participants while they do a tedious but not impossible 
cognitive task.    
 Due to the findings that stereotype threat works, in part, by decreasing motivation 
within the stereotyped individual (Desrichard & Kopetz, 2005; Seibt & Forster, 2004), 
we expected that participants in the control and ST relief conditions would report higher 
motivation as measured by the motivation component of the DSSQ. We expected higher 
levels of motivation to be related to fewer reports of TUT, but not TRI. This was not the 
case. No differences between the OA groups existed for motivation and motivation as 
measured by the DSSQ did not correlate with mind-wandering and OSPAN performance 
variables. We also expected that value placed in the memory domain, as measured by the 
Achievement subscale of the MIA, will be positively correlated with TRI. However, MIA 
Achievement scores did not correlate with probe-caught TRI.  
The relationship between anxiety and stereotype threat is not straight-forward. 
Hess et al. (2003) hypothesized that anxiety would act as a mediator of stereotype threat’s 
detrimental effect on performance. Individuals under stereotype threat were hypothesized 
to experience increased physiological arousal, which might in turn hijack cognitive 
control (Levy et al., 2000; Blascovitch, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; Croizet et al., 
2004).
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However, Hess et al. (2003) reported no significant results for anxiety as 
measured by the MIA-Anx score. Other researchers have found effects (Chasteen et al., 
2005 (Experiment 3); Abrams et al., 2008). We predicted that those in the ST primed and 
control OA groups would report increased anxiety compared to the ST relief OA group. 
However, this was not the case. Furthermore, MIA-Anx did not correlate with TRI or 
with either OSPAN performance variable. The MIA Anxiety items tap into how anxious 
the participant would feel if they had to complete a variety of different tasks that had a 
memory component. Many of the items corresponded to everyday tasks such as 
navigating to a previously visited but unfamiliar location or introducing someone that you 
had just met. It is possible that this measure of anxiety was not capturing how anxious 
participants feel while completing the kinds of novel memory tasks that they would do in 
a cognitive psychology lab. A better way to have measured anxiety may have been to 
include an additional Likert-style post-task question asking people how anxious they felt 
while trying to remember the letter stimuli during the OSPAN.       
Finally, we intended to use the Age-Attitudes IAT as a manipulation check in this 
study. In Pilot Experiments 1 and 2, we found that female YAs that were primed for 
math-related stereotype threat were slower to pair the concepts of “female” and “math” 
together on a Math-Gender IAT than controls. In the aging study, we predicted that older 
adults primed for memory-related stereotype would be slower to pair photos of old faces 
with positively-valenced words on the IAT than would participants relieved of stereotype 
threat. Instead, IAT scores did not differ between any of our groups. 
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It is possible that the Age-Attitudes IAT used was not sensitive enough to be used 
as ST manipulation check. In the pilot experiments, we created an IAT that was 
specifically about gender and math by modifying the existing Gender-Science IAT. 
However, in the aging study the IAT used was not specifically about age and cognition. 
The Age-Attitudes IAT may reflect general preferences for or against older adults, but it 
may not specifically reflect underlying implicit beliefs about aging and cognitive ability. 
Perhaps if we modified the Age-Attitudes IAT to specifically be about aging and 
cognition we would have found group differences after reliving or priming participants 
for memory-related ST. For example, we could have switched out unpleasant words (such 
as “boring”) for words about cognitive decline (such as “forgetful”).
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CHAPTER VI 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
 This research extends and informs prior work on mind-wandering in a few 
different ways. First, stereotype threat has been examined as a possible mind-wandering 
trigger in three different experiments. Although it has been proposed that individuals 
experiencing stereotype threat have increased in worry-laden monitoring of performance 
and increased negative self-talk (Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, and Kiesner, 2005; Popham 
& Hess, 2013), this research has more directly examine the thought processes of those 
individuals through the use of online thought probes.  
Again, the results of our two younger adult pilot studies suggest that female 
younger adults primed for math-related stereotype threat do specifically report increased 
TRI. In our aging study, we found that priming memory-related stereotype threat in older 
adults similarly resulted in increased reporting of TRI and decreased accuracy on a letter 
recall task. Relief of memory-related stereotype threat in older adults resulted in 
decreases in TRI compared to OA controls and improved accuracy on a letter recall task.  
Past work has found that stereotype threat does seem to trigger overall levels of 
mind-wandering, at least in young adults (Mrazek et al., 2011). However, the thought 
probes used by Mrazek and colleagues did not allow participants to distinguish between 
different types of mind-wandering such as TRI. Rather, participants were instructed to 
 
75 
	
indicate, on a Likert-scale, the degree to which they were mind-wandering in general  
(1=thoughts were completely on task, 5 = thoughts were completely about unrelated 
concerns). Participants only indicated whether they were experiencing TUTs or TRI on 
post-task questionnaires (Mrazek, et al., 2011).   
Using online thought probes, we have been able determine the specific type of 
mind-wandering those under stereotype threat experience, verifying that while proportion 
of TUTs does not increase with ST, proportion of TRI does. While work within the 
stereotype threat literature has proposed increased worry-laden monitoring (which we 
refer to as reactive TRI) in those under stereotype threat (Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, and 
Kiesner, 2005; Popham & Hess, 2013), we have found evidence that those under 
stereotype threat experience elevated amounts of both evaluative TRI and TRI regarding 
task strategy. However, it is unclear if the evaluative TRI experienced by those in our ST 
primed conditions is representative of the worry-laden, negative self-appraisal believed to 
occur with stereotype threat. Across studies, we found little evidence of increased 
negative mood or increased anxiety in our ST primed participants.  
Furthermore, while we know that individuals, particularly those under stereotype 
threat, engage in mind-wandering about task approach, it is unclear exactly how 
participants were strategizing during the OSPAN task in the aging study. Likewise, it is 
unclear if proactive TRI could have positive down-stream benefits for performance. In 
this aging study, we found no evidence of improved performance with increasing 
amounts of mind-wandering about task strategy. Indeed, the participants in the ST primed 
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group reported more proactive and reactive TRI than any other condition and also had the 
worst performance on both the letter recall and math verification portions of the OSPAN. 
 Indeed, in the OA ST primed group, proactive TRI was actually negatively 
correlated with recall accuracy. More work can be done looking at the emotional valence 
of reactive TRI reports and determining whether or not proactive TRI can be beneficial 
for performance on other types of cognitive tasks. Finally, the correlational analyses for 
these studies are somewhat underpowered. We expected a variety of factors would 
correlate with our mind-wandering and performance variables, and that we might find 
differential patterns on correlations between our control, ST relief and ST primed 
conditions. However, many of the variables we believed would correlate (such as mood 
and motivation) with mind-wandering and task performance did not correlate in these 
studies, or were correlated inconsistently across our stereotype threat groups. A larger N 
study may be necessary to determine which variables mediate the relationship between 
mind-wandering and stereotype threat and between stereotype threat and performance on 
tasks within the stereotyped domain. 
Conclusions 
In three separate experiments evidence was found for stereotype threat as a mind-
wandering trigger. Following the priming of math-related stereotype, young women in 
Pilot Experiment 1 and Pilot Experiment 2 exhibited significantly more task-related 
interference than controls. In the subsequent aging study, older adults exhibited decreased 
task-related interference and improved accuracy on a memory task compared to older 
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adult controls and older adults primed for memory-related stereotype threat. Current 
concerns primed by instruction manipulations and by the typical testing environment 
appear to be one cause for the elevated TRI typically seen in older adults. However, it is 
still unclear which factors mediate the relationships between stereotype threat, mind 
wandering, and performance on tasks within the stereotyped domain. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Appendix S contains plots of mean proportion of thought report (On-task, TUT, 
TRI, Proactive TRI, and Reactive TRI) by OSPAN block for each group. The 
OSPAN was divided into eight blocks and subjects responded to an online 
thought-probe once per block. The plots therefore provide a time course of mind-
wandering during the OSPAN.   
2. Appendix S contains plots of mean letter recall accuracy by OSPAN block for 
each group. The OSPAN was divided into eight blocks and subjects completely 
roughly eight trials per block. The plots therefore provide a time course of letter 
recall accuracy during the OSPAN.  For each group, recall accuracy increased 
during the course of the OSPAN. 
3. For all of the correlations reported in this section of the manuscript, a single 
asterix (*) denotes a p value < .05. A double asterix (**) denotes a p value <.01. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TASK 
 
 
The IAT indirectly assesses attitudes towards a group or category by collecting 
the response latencies for category judgment tasks. It has been argued that, because the 
IAT directs people to make correct category membership judgments rather than explicit 
category/group evaluations, the IAT avoids having participants respond in a way that is 
based on social desirability rather than underlying beliefs (Greenwald et al., 1998). The 
IAT is based on the idea that judgments congruent with participants’ implicit associations 
between categories and exemplars, or between categories and their associated 
characteristics, will be easier and therefore quicker to make than judgments that are 
incongruent with a view held by the participants. Stronger implicit associations should 
result in faster congruent and slower incongruent judgments, increasing the difference 
between congruent and incongruent response times (RTs).  
For example, an age-based IAT, such as the Age Attitude IAT, involves 
judgments being made about targets of two “bipolar” categories, for example, Age 
(“young” and “old”, represented by photographs of a young individual and an old 
individual) and Valence (“pleasant” and “unpleasant”, represented by positively or 
negatively valenced words). Figure 1 below offers a schematic of a typical IAT trial. 
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Figure 2 below offers a schematic of a typical IAT. In this example, the category Age is 
practiced on Blocks 1 and 4 (with key assignments reversed between these two blocks) 
and Valence categorization is practiced on Block 2. These trials allow the participant to 
practice the key assignments for the various categories.  
Blocks 3 (a congruent block) and 5 (an incongruent block) both force participants 
to simultaneously concentrate on the two categories (Age and Valence) in order to sort 
either a pleasant versus unpleasant word or a young versus an old photograph into the 
appropriate category. On trials in the congruent block, the right-hand and left-hand 
assignment of the category poles is consistent with the expected, stereotype-based 
attitudes (e.g., Old and Unpleasant appear on the same side of the computer screen while 
Young and Pleasant appear together on the other side). Pleasant versus unpleasant words 
appearing in the middle of the computer screen must be sorted into the appropriate 
category using a left-handed or right-handed key response. In the aforementioned 
example, a word corresponding to the category Unpleasant would be sorted with a left-
handed response. On trials in the incongruent block, exemplars from one of the categories 
are switched (e.g., Old and Pleasant now appear on the same side of the screen and 
Young and Unpleasant appear on the opposite side). Order of congruent and incongruent 
blocks are counterbalanced between participants.  
 
94 
	
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of an IAT sequence. Faces and words are presented 
for a short time. Both old and young faces, along with positively or negatively valenced 
words, are present in the stimuli set. The stimuli are presented in a randomized sequence. 
The subject must classify each stimuli to the left or right category according to the labels 
displayed on the top of the screen. Reaction times are recorded in each session.  
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Sequence Block 1: 
Category I 
Discrimination
Block 2: 
Category II 
Discrimination
Block 3: 
Category I + II 
Discrimination
Block 4: 
Reversed 
Category I 
Discrimination
Block 5: 
Category I + II 
Incongruent 
Task 
Hand 
Assignment 
Left        Right 
Hand      Hand 
Left        Right 
Hand      Hand 
Left        Right 
Hand      Hand 
Left        Right 
Hand      Hand 
Left        Right 
Hand      Hand 
Age 
Attitude 
IAT 
Old        
Young
Unpleasant 
Pleasant
Old 
Unpleasant 
Young
Pleasant
Young      
Old
Young 
Unpleasant 
Old
Pleasant
 
Figure 2. IAT task blocks for an Age Attitude IAT. Categories (e.g., Young and Old) are assigned to either right or left 
response keys. For the above IAT, the difference in average response time for incongruent Block 5 and congruent Block 3 are 
used in the calculation of IAT scores. In this example, a positive IAT score represents more positive implicit attitudes towards 
young compared to old adults.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
PILOT EXPERIMENTS IAT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Note: Lines indicate page breaks.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
You will now begin a task designed to assess individuals’ underlying attitudes towards 
mathematics. The Math Attitudes Task assesses implicit feelings participants have 
towards different fields of studies by measuring how long a participant takes to sort items 
into different categories. This task will assess ability of participants to quickly and 
correctly sort mathematical items into the appropriate category (MATHEMATICS) 
compared to their ability to quickly and correctly sort liberal arts items into their 
appropriate category (LIBERAL ARTS).  
Additionally, participants are asked to complete a secondary, unrelated sorting task. In 
this study, the secondary task will be sorting different items into the categories of MALE 
or FEMALE. 
You will complete two practice trials of this Math Attitudes Task before the experimental 
trials begin. 
Press ENTER to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the following tasks, you will be presented with a set of words to classify into 
categories. The following is a list of category labels and the various items that belong to 
those categories. Please take a moment to look over the table below and press ENTER 
when finished. 
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CATEGORY Items 
MALE Man, Boy, Father, Husband, Son, Uncle 
FEMALE Woman, Girl, Mother, Wife, Daughter, 
Aunt 
MATHEMATICS Physics, Engineering, Algebra, 
Geometry, Calculus, Math 
LIBERAL ARTS English, Literature, Art, History, 
Humanities, Philosophy 
Please note: 
 Two category labels on the top of the computer screen will tell you which 
words presented in the middle of the screen go with each key 
 Each word has one correct classification 
 Sort items by category membership. Words in red are categorized with the 
red labels. Words in black are categorized with the black labels. 
 For best results avoid distractions 
Press ENTER to continue.  
________________________________________________________________________
Place your middle or index fingers on the E and I keys of your keyboard. Different words 
representing the categories seen at the top of the computer screen will appear one-by-one 
in the middle of the screen.  
When an item belongs to a category on the left, press the E key; when the item belongs to 
a category on the right, press the I key. If you make an error, an X (red) will appear. If 
you make an error it is okay. Quickly correct the error by pressing the opposite key. 
 
98 
	
This is a timed sorting task. Please GO AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN while making as 
few mistakes as possible. While occasional mistakes are fine, going too slow or making 
too many errors may result in a null score and unusable data. 
You will now complete the first practice trial of this task.   
Press ENTER to begin.  
 
Participant will complete the first practice block. Here, MALE will be presented as the 
category heading on the top right portion of the screen. FEMALE will be presented as the 
category heading on the top left portion of the screen. 
 
Very good. You will now complete the second practice trial of this task. New items will 
appear, and this time rather than sorting people into the categories of MALE or 
FEMALE, you will be asked to sort fields of study into MATHEMATICS or LIBERAL 
ARTS.  
Again, this is a timed sorting task. Please GO AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN while 
making as few mistakes as possible. While occasional mistakes are fine, going too slow 
or making too many errors may result in a null score and unusable data. 
Press ENTER to begin. 
________________________________________________________________________
Participant will complete the second practice block. Here, MATHEMTATICS will be 
presented as the category heading on the top right portion of the screen. LIBERAL ARTS 
will be presented as the category heading on the top left portion of the screen. 
________________________________________________________________________
For the experimental portions of the task, FOUR categories heads will appear, two on 
each side of the computer screen. Here, the category headings of MALE and FEMALE 
will be presented in one color, and the category headings of MATHEMATICS and 
LIBERAL ARTS will be presented in a different color.  
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Again, you will be required to sort items presented one-by-one in the middle of the screen 
into the appropriate category seen at the top of the screen, using the E key to sort items 
into categories appearing on the left and using the I key to sort categories appearing on 
the right.  
Items belong to one category. The color of the items may help you identify the 
appropriate category.  
Remember to go as fast as you can while making as few mistakes as possible. Correct 
any errors by hitting the opposite key, as you have done before. 
 
Press ENTER to begin. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Participants will now see MALE/LIBERAL ARTS as FEMALE/MATHEMATICS as 
category labels on the right. 
________________________________________________________________________
Sort the same four categories again. Remember to go as fast as you can while making as 
few mistakes as possible. The color of the category and item labels may help you identify 
the appropriate category. Use the E and I keys to categorize items into the four groups 
left and right, and correct errors by hitting the opposite key, as you have done before. 
Press ENTER to begin.  
________________________________________________________________________
Participants will now see MALE/MATHEMATICS as category labels on the left and 
FEMALE/LIBERAL ARTS as category labels on the right. 
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For the next portion of the task, only two categories will appear on the top left and top 
right of the screen, and they have now switched positions. The concept that was 
previously on the left now appears on the right, and the concept that was on the right is 
now on the left. Practice this new configuration by sorting items into left categories using 
the E key and into right categories using the I key, as you have done before. 
Press ENTER to begin.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Participants will now see FEMALE as category label on the left and MALE as category 
label on the right. 
________________________________________________________________________
Very good. For the next experimental portions of the task, FOUR categories heads will 
appear once again, two on each side of the computer screen. Again, the category headings 
of MALE and FEMALE will be presented in one color, and the category headings of 
MATHEMATICS and LIBERAL ARTS will be presented in a different color. The color 
of the items presented in the middle of the screen may help you sort items into the 
appropriate categories.  
 
Continue to sort items into the appropriate categories as you have done so before.   
 
Remember to go as fast as you can while making as few mistakes as possible. Correct 
any errors by hitting the opposite key, as you have done before. 
Press ENTER to begin.  
________________________________________________________________________
Participants will now see FEMALE/MATHEMATICS as category labels on the left and 
MALE/LIBERAL ARTS as category labels on the right. 
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Sort the same four categories again. Remember to go as fast as you can while making as 
few mistakes as possible. 
The color of the category and item labels may help you identify the appropriate category. 
Use the E and I keys to categorize items into the four groups left and right, and correct 
errors by hitting the opposite key, as you have done before. 
Press ENTER to begin.  
________________________________________________________________________
Participants will now see FEMALE/LIBERAL ARTS as category labels on the left and 
MALE/MATHEMATICS as category labels on the right. 
________________________________________________________________________
You are now finished with the Math Attitudes Task! 
Press the ENTER key to continue onto the next task. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
OPERATION SPAN TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Note: Lines indicate page breaks. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
In the next portion of the experiment, you will be asked to memorize letters that you see 
on the screen while you also solve mathematical equations.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
In the next few minutes, you will have some practice to become familiarized with how 
this portion of the experiment works. 
We will begin by practicing the letter part of the experiment. 
Click the mouse to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________
For this practice set, letters will appear on the screen one at a time. Try to remember each 
letter in the order presented.   
After 2-3 letters have been shown, you will see a screen listing 12 possible letters with a 
check box beside each one. 
Your job is to select each letter in the order presented.  To do this, use the mouse to select 
the box beside each letter.  The letters you select will appear at the bottom of the screen.   
Click the mouse button to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________
When you have selected all the letters, and they are in the correct order, hit the EXIT box 
at the bottom right of the screen. 
If you make a mistake, hit the CLEAR box to start over. If you forget one of the letters, 
click the BLANK box to mark the spot for the missing letter. 
Remember, it is very important to get the letters in the same order as you see them.  If 
you forget one, use the BLANK box to mark the position. 
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Do you have any questions? If yes, press BACKSPACE to read the instructions again.  
If not, click the mouse to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Participants will complete one cycle consisting 5 letter memorization trials. A total of 12 
letters will be memorized during the cycle, but with letter set size will vary between 2 and 
3 letters. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Now you will practice doing the math part of the experiment.  
A math problem will appear on the screen, like this: 
(2 * 1) + 1 = ? 
As soon as you see the math problem, you should compute the correct answer.   
In the above problem, the answer 3 is correct. 
When you know the correct answer, you will click the mouse button. 
Click the mouse to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________
You will see a number displayed on the next screen, along with a box marked TRUE and 
a box marked FALSE.  
If the number on the screen is the correct answer to the math problem, click on the TRUE 
box with the mouse. 
If the number is not the correct answer, click on the FALSE box. 
For example, if you see the problem  
(2 * 2) + 1 = ? 
and the number on the following screen is 5 click the TRUE box, because the answer is 
correct. 
If you see the problem 
(2 * 2) + 1 =  ? 
and the number on the next screen is 6 click the FALSE box, because the correct answer 
is 5, not 6. 
 
104 
	
After you click on one of the boxes, the computer will tell you if you made the right 
choice. 
Click the mouse to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________
It is important that you get the math problems correct.  It is also important that you try 
and solve the problem as quickly as you can. 
Do you have any questions? If yes, press BACKSPACE to read the instructions again.  
If not, click the mouse to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________
Participants will verify 16 mathematical equations during this practice trial. 
________________________________________________________________________
Now you will practice doing both parts of the experiment at the same time. 
In the next practice set, you will be given one of the math problems.  Once you make 
your decision about the math problem, a letter will appear on the screen.  Try and 
remember the letter. 
In the previous section where you only solved math problems, the computer computed 
your average time to solve the problems.  If you take longer than your average time, the 
computer will automatically move you onto the letter part, thus skipping the True or 
False part and will count that problem as a math error.   
Therefore it is VERY important to solve the problems as quickly and as accurately as 
possible 
Click the mouse to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________
After the letter goes away, another math problem will appear, and then another letter. 
At the end of each set of letters and math problems, a recall screen will appear.  Use the 
mouse to select the letters you just saw.  Try your best to get the letters in the correct 
order. 
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It is important to work QUICKLY and ACCURATELY on the math.  Make sure you 
know the answer to the math problem before clicking to the next screen.   
You will not be told if your answer to the math problem is correct. 
After the recall screen, you will be given feedback about your performance regarding 
both the number of letters recalled and the percent correct on the math problems. 
Do you have any questions? If yes, press BACKSPACE to read the instructions again. 
If not, click the mouse to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________
Participants will now go through the OSPAN practice block. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
That is the end of the practice. 
The real trials will look like the practice trials you just completed. First you will get a 
math problem to solve, then a letter to remember.   
When you see the recall screen, select the letters in the order presented.   If you forget a 
letter, click the BLANK box to mark where it should go.  
Some sets will have more math problems and letters than others. 
It is important that you do your best on both the math problems and the letter recall parts 
of this experiment. 
Remember on the math you must work as QUICKLY and ACCURATELY as possible. 
Click the mouse to continue. 
________________________________________________________________________
Occasionally, the experimental task with pause and thought probes will come up asking 
you to report on what you were just thinking about before the thought probe appeared. 
The probe will appear as follows: 
What were you just thinking about? 
1. The task: Focused on completing the task, verifying equations and remembering letters 
2. Task approach: How to improve your task performance 
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3. Task evaluation: How effectively you were completing the task, or worrying about 
performance. 
4. Everyday things: Thinking about recent or impending life events 
5. Current state of being: Thinking about conditions such as hunger or sleepiness. 
6. Personal worries: Thinking about concerns, troubles or fears not relating to the 
experimental task. 
7. Daydreams: fantasies disconnected from reality 
8. Other  
Please respond to the probes honestly by indicating using the keyboard the number that 
corresponds to what you were thinking about JUST BEFORE the probe appeared.  
Do you have any questions? If yes, press BACKSPACE to read the instructions again.  
If not, click the mouse to continue. 
 
Participants will now complete the experimental OSPAN block, consisting of 90 trials. 
Thought probes will be presented randomly and will appear approximately every 2 
minutes. There are 10 thought probes.
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APPENDIX D 
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCALE 
 
 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988)  
 
PANAS Questionnaire  
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word.  
 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment OR 
indicate the extent you have felt this way over the past week (circle the instructions you 
followed when taking this measure) 
 
 
 
Scoring: Items 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 19 are added to obtain the positive affect 
score. The positive affect score can range from 10-50 with higher scores indicating higher 
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levels of positive affect. Items 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, and 20 are added to obtain the 
negative affect score. The negative affect score ranges from 10-50 with lower scores 
indicating higher levels of negative affect. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
METAMEMORY IN ADULTHOOD QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Memory Questionnaire  
 
Directions Different people use their memory in different ways in their everyday lives. 
For example, some people make shopping lists, while others do not. Some people are 
good at remembering names, while others are not. In this questionnaire, we would like 
you to tell us how you use your memory and how you feel about it. There are no right or 
wrong answers to these questions because people are different. Please take your time and 
answer each of these questions to the best of your ability. Each question is followed by 
five choices. Draw a circle around the letter corresponding to your choice. Mark only one 
letter for each statement. Some of the questions ask your opinion about memory-related 
statements; for example:  
 
  
My memory will get worse as I get older.  
a. agree strongly  
b. agree  
c. undecided  
d. disagree  
e. disagree strongly  
 
  
In this example you could, of course, choose any one of the answers. If you agree 
strongly with the statement you would circle a. If you disagree strongly you would circle 
letter e. The b and d answers indicate less strong agreement. The letter c answer gives 
you a middle choice, but don't use c unless you really can't decide on any of the other 
responses.  
 
Some of the questions ask how often you do certain things that may be related to your 
memory. For example: 
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Do you make a list of things to be accomplished during the day?   
a. never  
b. rarely  
c. sometimes  
d. often  
e. always  
 
 
Again, you could choose any one of the answers. Choose the one that comes closest to 
what you usually do. Don't worry if the time estimate is not exact, or if there are some 
exceptions.  
 
Keep these points in mind:  
Answer every question, even if it doesn't seem to apply to you very well.  
Answer as honestly as you can what is true for you. Please do not mark something 
because it seems like the "right thing to say."
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Note: The above questionnaire includes additional items that will not be used in the 
proposed study. Participants will only complete the Achievement, Anxiety, and Locus of 
Control subscales of this questionnaire.  
Scoring: The Achievement subscale evaluates importance of having a good memory. 
Higher scores indicate higher levels of motivation to perform well on memory tasks. This 
subscale consists of 16 items: 2, 7, 13, 24, 37, 40, 46, 47, 55, 65, 68, 79, 83, 86, and 103. 
Items 24 and 26 are reverse-scored. 
The Anxiety subscale evaluates the influence of anxiety on cognitive performance. 
Higher scores indicate higher levels of anxiety while performing memory tasks. This 
subscale consists of 14 items: 5, 8, 12, 15, 22, 23, 42, 53, 66, 70, 78, 84, 87, and 99. Item 
87 is reverse-scored. 
The Locus subscale evaluates perceived control over memory skills. Higher scores 
indicate higher levels of internality. This subscale consists of nine items: 33, 34, 35, 62, 
63, 69, 73, 101, 102, and 106. Items 33, 34, and 73 are reverse-scored. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
DUNDESS STRES STATE QUESTIONNAIRE (THOUGHT CONTENT) 
 
 
THINKING CONTENT 
 
This set of questions concerns the kinds of thoughts that go through people's heads at particular times, for example while they 
are doing some task or activity. Below is a list of thoughts, some of which you might have had recently. Please indicate 
roughly how often you had each thought while performing the task, by circling a number from the list below. 
 
1= Never 2= Once 3= A few times 4= Often 5= Very often 
 
1. I thought about how I should work more carefully.     1 2 3 4 5 
2. I thought about how much time I had left.      1 2 3 4 5 
3. I thought about how others have done on this task.     1 2 3 4 5 
4. I thought about the difficulty of the problems.      1 2 3 4 5 
5. I thought about my level of ability.       1 2 3 4 5 
6. I thought about the purpose of the experiment.      1 2 3 4 5 
7. I thought about how I would feel if I were told how I performed.   1 2 3 4 5 
8. I thought about how often I get confused.       1 2 3 4 5 
9. I thought about members of my family.       1 2 3 4 5 
10. I thought about something that made me feel guilty.     1 2 3 4 5 
11. I thought about personal worries.       1 2 3 4 5 
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12. I thought about something that made me feel angry.     1 2 3 4 5 
13. I thought about something that happened earlier today.    1 2 3 4 5 
14. I thought about something that happened in the recent past    1 2 3 4 5 
(last few days, but not today). 
15. I thought about something that happened in the distant past    1 2 3 4 5 
16. I thought about something that might happen in the future.    1 2 3 4 5 
 
Scoring: Items 1-18 on this questionnaire are summated to provide a measure of task-related interference (TRI). Items 9-16 on 
this questionnaire are summated to provide a measure of task-unrelated thinking (TUT). 
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APPENDIX G 
 
DUNDEE STRESS STATE QUESTIONNAIRE (MOTIVATION) 
 
 
MOTIVATION 
 
Please answer some questions about your attitude to the task you are about to do. Rate your agreement with the following 
statements by circling one of the following answers: 
 
Extremely = 4 Very much = 3 Somewhat = 2 A little bit = 1 Not at all = 0 
 
1. The content of the task was interesting       0 1 2 3 4 
2. The only reason to do the task is to get an external reward (e.g. payment)  0 1 2 3 4 
3. I would rather have spent the time doing the task on something else   0 1 2 3 4 
4. I was concerned about not doing as well as I can      0 1 2 3 4 
5. I wanted to perform better than most people do      0 1 2 3 4 
6. I became fed up with the task        0 1 2 3 4 
7. I was eager to do well         0 1 2 3 4 
8. I would be disappointed if I failed to do well on this task     0 1 2 3 4 
9. I was committed to attaining my performance goals    0 1 2 3 4 
10. Doing the task was worthwhile        0 1 2 3 4 
11. I found the task boring         0 1 2 3 4 
12. I felt apathetic about my performance       0 1 2 3 4 
13. I wanted to succeed on the task        0 1 2 3 4 
 
              
1
3
0
14. The task brought out my competitive drives      0 1 2 3 4 
15. I was motivated to do the task        0 1 2 3 4 
 
Scoring: Items 1-15 assess motivation. Items 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, and 14 are summated to get a measure of success motivation, or 
motivation to excel in task performance. Item number 15 can be used to provide an overall level of motivation, if needed. The 
remainder of the items are summated to provide a measure of how interesting participants thought the task was. Items 1 and 10 
are positively scores while items 2, 3, 6, 11, and 12 are reversed scored. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Participant Information Survey 
 
 
In order to better understand the results of the study you have agreed to participate 
in, we need to know a few things about you and your background.  
We will use this information for research purposes only, and it will be kept strictly 
confidential. You will note that we do not ask for your name during this survey.   
Please respond to the following questions completely. Ask the Experimenter if you 
need assistance in answering any question. 
If you have limited experience with computers, or are unsure about how to use the 
computer in answering these questions, please ask the Experimenter for assistance 
at any time. 
Please press ENTER to begin. 
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1. My sex is (please circle):   Male   Female 
 
2. My birth date is:   
        (Month)      (Day)   (Year) 
 
3. What is your native language? 
 English:   _____  Other (please specify):  ________________ 
 
4. What is your ethnic background? Please check the appropriate alternative. 
 _____ First Nations origin (A person having origins in any of the 
original peoples of North America, and who maintains a cultural 
identification through tribal or band affiliation or community recognition) 
 _____ Asian or Pacific Islander (A person having origins in any of the 
original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, 
or the Pacific Islands.  This area includes, for example, China, India, 
Pakistan, Japan, Korea, the Philippine Islands, and Samoa.) 
 _____ Black, not of Hispanic origin (A person having origins in any of 
the black racial groups of Africa) 
 _____ Hispanic (A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or 
South American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race) 
______White, not of Hispanic origin (A person having origins in any of 
the 
original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East) 
 
5.  Which academic diplomas / degrees / certificates have you obtained?  (Please 
circle ALL that apply) 
a)   no degree 
b)   high school diploma 
c)   technical/trade school or community college 
d)   Bachelor’s (e.g., BA, BSc, BComm.) 
e)   Master’s (e.g., MA, MSc, MEd, LLM) 
f)    Law degree (Bachelor=s, LLB) 
g)   Medical degree (MD) 
h)   PhD or other doctoral degree 
i)    other or additional degrees (please specify) 
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6. For EACH of the following levels of education, please circle the highest grade or 
years of full-time attendance you have COMPLETED. Do not include part-time 
or extension courses taken for interest. 
 
a)  Grade/Intermediate School 
Grade 1   Grade 2   Grade 3   Grade 4   Grade 5   Grade 6   Grade 7   
Grade 8 
b)  Secondary/High School 
  none  Grade 9   Grade 10   Grade 11   Grade 12   Grade 13 
c)  Technical, Trade, Nursing or Business School, or Community College 
none  1 year   2 years   3 years   4 years   5+ years 
d)  University (Bachelor=s Level) 
none  1st year   2nd year   3rd year   4th year   5th year 
e)  Post-Graduate School (e.g., Master's, PhD) 
none  1 year   2 years   3 years   4 years   5+ years 
 
7. Are you currently involved in volunteer work?   Yes _____ No _____ 
If yes, please briefly describe your volunteer activities: 
 
8.          Are you currently a student?   Yes _____ No _____ 
 If yes, how many hours a week do you spend in classes? _______ hrs  
 Are you pursuing a specific certificate, diploma or degree? Yes _____  No _____  
 Please briefly describe what you are studying: 
  
9. Compared to a perfect state of health, I believe my overall health to be (Please 
circle one): 
 a. very good 
 b. good 
 c. fair 
 d. poor 
 e. very poor 
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10. Compared to other people my age, I believe my overall health to be (Please circle 
one): 
 a. very good 
 b. good 
 c. fair 
d. poor 
e. very poor 
 
11. Compared to other people my age, I believe my eyesight to be (Please circle one): 
 a. very good 
 b. good 
 c. fair 
 d. poor 
 e. very poor 
 
12. Compared to other people my age, I believe my hearing to be (Please circle one): 
 a. very good 
 b. good 
 c. fair 
 d. poor 
 e. very poor 
 
13. In the past 3 years, my health has affected my daily activities in the following way 
(Please circle one): 
 a.  not applicable 
 b.  improved 
 c.  no change 
d. slightly reduced 
e. moderately reduced 
f. drastically reduced 
g. gave up employment 
h. gave up travel 
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14. The following chart lists a number of health-related conditions that may apply to 
you.  Please answer all parts of each question as concisely as you can.  The first 
part of each question is the most important for you to answer.  Specifically, we 
would like to know whether or not you have ever been diagnosed by a medical 
practitioner with the condition in question.  If you responded YES, please 
complete the remaining parts of the question. 
 
 
 
Do you suffer from this 
condition? 
If YES, how serious is your condition? (please check 
one) 
At what 
AGE were 
you 
diagnosed 
with this 
condition? 
 
No 
 
Yes, not 
serious 
Yes, 
moderately 
serious 
 
Yes, very 
serious 
Hearing problems (e.g., tinitus) 
that cannot be corrected with a 
hearing aid 
     
Visual disorders (e.g., glaucoma, 
cataracts, macular degeneration) 
that cannot be corrected with 
glasses 
     
Asthma      
Bronchitis      
Tuberculosis      
Hardening of the arteries      
High blood pressure      
Stroke      
Low blood pressure      
Gall bladder problems      
Liver trouble      
Stomach ulcer      
Kidney or bladder trouble or 
cystitis 
     
Gynecological problems      
Colitis or diverticulitis      
Paralysis not related to stroke      
Spinal condition (e.g., scoliosis)      
Back trouble      
Parkinson’s disease      
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Epilepsy      
Thyroid      
Prostate problems      
Anemia      
Depression      
Alcohol dependence      
Drug dependence      
Heart trouble      
Osteo-arthritis      
Rheumatoid arthritis      
Osteoporosis      
Diabetes (sugar sickness)      
Cancer      
Migraine      
Encephalitis      
Meningitis      
Head injury      
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15. Are you presently taking any drugs or medications (prescription or other)? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
If yes, here is a chart of medications that people often have to take.  Please indicate 
whether you are taking any of these medications  (Check all that apply). 
 
 medicine for high blood pressure (e.g., Prinivil, Lopressor, Procardia, Vasotec, etc.) 
 digitalis or other medication for your heart 
 medicine for chest pain/angina (e.g., Nitroglycerine, Digoxin, Procardia, etc.) 
 any sort of diabetes medicine (pills, pumps, or injections: e.g., Glucotrol, Tolinase, 
Insulin) 
 cortisone or anti-inflammatory drugs for arthritis (e.g., Prednisone, Tolectin, etc.) 
 pills to make you lose water or salt (diuretics: e.g., Lasix, Bumex, etc.) 
 tranquillizers or sedatives (e.g., Ativan, Xanax, Valium, etc.) 
 sleeping pills/hypnotics (e.g., Chloral hydrate, Restoril, Dalmane, etc.) 
 blood thinner medicine (anticoagulants: e.g., Coumadin, Heparin, etc.) 
 vitamin or mineral supplements (e.g., Iron, Calcium, Potassium, etc.) 
 female hormone supplements (e.g., Estrogen, Premarin, etc.) 
 appetite suppressants or diet pills 
 pain medication (more than 2-3 times a week: e.g., Tylenol, Advil, Percocet, Darvocet-
N-100, etc.) 
 allergy or asthma medicine 
 ulcer or other stomach medicine (e.g., Tagamet, Lactate, Prilosec, etc) 
 antibiotics (e.g., Penicillin, Ampicillin, Tetracycline, etc.) 
 medicine to control seizures (e.g., Dilantin, Tegretol, etc.) 
 medicine to control tremors (e.g., L-dopa, Sinemet, Parlodel, etc.) 
 oral contraceptives 
 stimulants to help you stay awake 
 eye medication (e.g., eye drops/ointments: e.g., IsoptoCarpine, etc.) 
 anti-depressant medication (e.g., Wellbutrin, Elavil, Zoloft, Prozac, etc.) 
 anti-psychotic medication (e.g., Lithium, Prolixin, etc.) 
 chemotherapy for cancer 
 oral medication for cancer (e.g., Nolvadex, Cytoxan, etc.) 
 medicine for a thyroid condition (e.g., Synthroid, Eltroxin, etc.) 
 other prescription or non-prescription drugs (please indicate) 
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16. Today, have you taken any drugs or medications (prescription or other) that tend 
to make you drowsy? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
17.  Do you smoke or use tobacco products?  (Please circle one) 
 a. Yes At what age did you start smoking?   __________ 
 b. No, I previously used tobacco but I have quit completely 
  For how many years did you use tobacco?   __________ 
 c. No, I have never used tobacco 
 
 If you currently use tobacco, what do you use?  (Please circle.  Complete all that apply) 
 a. Cigarettes 
  How many cigarettes do you smoke?  
  __________ cigarettes per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 b. Cigars 
  How many cigars do you smoke?  
  __________  cigars per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 c. Pipe 
  How many pipe bowls do you smoke?  
  __________ pipe bowls per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 d. Snuff or chewing tobacco 
  How many pinches or plugs do you use? 
  __________ pinches/plugs per__________ (day/week/month/year) 
 
18. Do you drink alcoholic beverages?  (Please circle one) 
a. Yes At what age did you start drinking?   __________ 
 b. No, I used to drink but have now completely given it up 
  For how many years did you drink?   __________ 
c. No, I never drink  
 
If you currently drink alcoholic beverages, what do you drink? (Please circle. 
Complete all that apply) 
 a. Beer 
  How many cans/bottles of beer do you consume? 
  __________ bottles/cans per __________ (day/week/month/year)
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b. Wine 
  How many glasses of wine do you consume? 
  __________ glasses per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 c. Hard liquor (i.e., with no mix added) 
  How many drinks do you consume?  (1 drink = 1 ounce of alcohol) 
  __________ drinks per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 d. Mixed drinks (i.e., alcohol with mix added) 
  How many mixed drinks do you consume?  (1 drink = 1 ounce of alcohol) 
  __________ mixed drinks per __________ (day/week/month/year) 
 
Thank You for your time! 
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APPENDIX I 
 
LIGHTHOUSE NEAR VISUAL ACUITY  
 
 
 
 
Verbal instructions:   
“This is a near acuity test. Hold this card such that the end of the cord is  
next to your eye and the string is pulled taut. Now read the lowest line of which 
you can easily read all five letters.” 
 
Scoring:  
If a participant reads a line incorrectly they are instructed to read the line 
immediately above it. This process repeats until the participant in able to correctly 
read all five letters of a line.  Scores are based on the lowest line that participants 
can read all five letter for. 
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APPENDIX J 
 
ADVANCE VOCABULARY TEST  
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APPENDIX K 
 
PATTERN COMPARISON TASK 
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APPENDIX L 
 
NEWSPAPER REPORTS FOR STEREOTYPE THREAT PRIMING 
 
 
Palo Alto (AP). In a study published in the journal Nature, scientists working at 
Harvard Medical School have found an interesting explanation for the stereotypical 
decline in memory as people age. “We have known for a long time that older adults don’t 
remember certain things like names or dates as well as they did when they were young” 
says Harvard professor Dr. William Lutz, “and older adults also have particularly poor 
memory for words.” Dr. Lutz explains that older adults tend to use fewer words and 
simpler sentences in conversation than their younger counterparts, and have thus lost 
many useful language skills as they aged. 
Interestingly, there is even evidence that the parts of the brain that deal with 
memory are different in both size and function in older adults when compared to younger 
adults. Using a technique called fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging), Dr. 
Lutz and his colleagues viewed a region of the brain called the prefrontal cortex, which is 
thought to be partially responsible for verbal memory. This research team found that the 
prefrontal cortex shrinks more with age than other parts of the brain. And more 
importantly, when asked to perform verbal memory tasks, this area in older adult brains 
was significantly less active. “The loss of prefrontal cortical tissue in older adults’ brains 
is consistent with the poor verbal memory performance observed in older adults.”  
These findings shed new light on the long-standing debate between those scholars 
who have argued that the brain simply declines in old age, and those who have argued 
that at least some memory skills are spared. “I hope that the Harvard [Medical School] 
data can finally close the book on this debate” says Stanford researcher Penny Delong, 
“Now we know that it’s just a fact of nature. Our brains deteriorate as we age, and as a 
result, so does our memory.” 
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Research: Aging is Linked to Memory Problems 
 
(Associated Press).  The negative stereotype about old age in American society is 
associated with a variety of things, not the least of which is a failing memory.  
Psychologists are quick to point out that stereotypes are often based in misconceptions.  
Unfortunately, an increasing number of research findings are strongly suggesting that this 
one is based in fact.  A recent study by psychologists Sandra Dawson and Andrea Long at 
Harvard Universitydemonstrates this point quite clearly. 
“We were interested in finding out how aging affects the memory performance of 
people in our country,” said Dr. Long.  “Our belief was that age differences in memory 
skills were not as pervasive as we are led to believe.  We especially thought that this 
would be true in today’s society, where older adults are healthier than ever before.” 
Dawson and Long tested their ideas by comparing the memory abilities of young 
and older adults on a series of tests that examined many different aspects of memory.  
Much previous research had shown that age differences existed in almost every type of 
remembering situation.  These researchers felt, however, that some of these findings were 
dated.   
“We were extremely discouraged by our findings,” said Dr. Dawson.   
In several studies, the researchers examined memory for a variety of things, such 
as faces, spatial patterns, and words.  The older adults in their sample, who ranged in age 
from 59 to 91, remembered less on average of every type of material than did younger 
adults, aged 15 to 30.  Dawson and Long were not necessarily surprised that they 
observed older adults having memory problems.  They were surprised, however, at the 
apparently pervasive nature of these problems. 
“Unfortunately, our findings reinforce the inevitability of aging-related memory 
loss,” noted Dr. Long.  “The fact that we continue to observe age differences in the 
current population suggests that historical changes in health practices have not had much 
of an impact on memory functioning.  This suggests that memory problems may be based 
in biologically based aging processes that are relatively immune to interventions.” 
Although findings such as these only reinforce our mostly negative conceptions of the 
effects of aging on mental abilities, these researchers note that this does not necessarily 
imply that older adults are unable to function in everyday life.  Given the inevitability of 
decline, however, they recommend that instructions for older people—such as taking 
medicine or directions to a restaurant—be written down rather than be left to failing 
memories. These researchers also suggest that, in order to maintain adequate levels of 
functioning, older adults may have to increasingly depend upon the help of memory tools 
as well as friends and family.
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APPENDIX M 
 
NEWSPAPER REPORTS FOR STEREOTYPE THREAT RELIEF 
  
 
Science Notes 
Memory for Words Spared in Old Age 
 
Palo Alto (AP). In a study published in the journal Nature, scientists working at 
Harvard Medical School have found an interesting explanation for the stereotypical 
decline in memory as people age. “We have known for a long time that older adults don’t 
remember certain things like names or dates as well as they did when they were young” 
says Harvard professor Dr. William Lutz, “but older adults tend to have very good 
memory for words.” Dr. Lutz explains that older adults have had much more experience 
with words than their younger counterparts, and have gained useful language skills that 
do not decline with age, particularly in the context of everyday interactions.  
Interestingly, there is even evidence that certain parts of the brain that deal with 
memory are not differentially affected by aging, and that other parts of the brain that 
support memory actually work harder in older adults than in younger adults. Using a 
technique called fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging), Dr. Lutz and his 
colleagues viewed a region of the brain called the prefrontal cortex, which is thought to 
be partially responsible for verbal skills. Dr. Lutz found that, when asked to perform 
verbal memory tasks, this area was active on in both hemispheres of older adults’ brains, 
whereas significant activity was only observed in the left hemisphere for younger adults. 
“This increased brain activity in the prefrontal cortex of older adults’ brains is consistent 
with the generally strong verbal memory performance observed in these individuals.” 
These findings shed new light on the long-standing debate between those scholars 
who have argued that the brain simply declines in old age, and those who have argued 
that at least some memory skills are spared. “I hope that the Harvard [Medical School] 
data can finally close the book on this debate” says Stanford researcher Penny Delong, 
“Now we know that it’s just a fact of nature. The brain does not uniformly deteriorate as 
we age. Some cognitive skills, such as those having to do with verbal memory, are 
maintain relatively well, and may even increase as we get older.” 
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Positive Outlook on Aging and Memory 
 
(Associated Press).  A recent study by researchers at Harvard University has shed 
new light on the factors associated with memory changes associated with aging.  
Psychologists Sandra Dawson and Andrea Long have proposed that culturally determined 
beliefs about aging may have an important effect on the prevalence of memory problems 
in later life. 
 
“Widespread beliefs about the inevitability of memory decline is common in 
some cultures, but not in others,” said Professor Long.  “The interesting implication of 
this view is that members of cultures with positive beliefs regarding aging may actually 
have memory skills that equal or exceed those of younger members of that culture.” 
Dawson and Long tested the impact of culture by comparing the memory abilities 
of young and older adults in the People’s Republic of China.  The Chinese culture has a 
long tradition of honoring their old people.  In the 2000 years preceding 1949, the 
Chinese government officially endorsed the practice of ancestor worship and respect for 
the old.  Interestingly, the Communist Revolution in China has actually strengthened 
rather than weakened these traditional views of old age.  The researchers reasoned that 
these positive views should be translated into superior memory performance by older 
adults in China. Their findings were very supportive of their hypothesis.  Using a variety 
of memory tasks, including memory for letters and words, Dawson and Long found that 
older adults aged 59 to 91 performed at the same level as younger adults aged 15 to 30.  
Interestingly, they also found that, regardless of age, these Chinese citizens had very 
positive views about aging and old age. 
“We were extremely encouraged by our findings,” said Dawson.  “They provide 
strong support for the idea that memory loss is not an inevitable aspect of old age.” She 
notes that there is most certainly a causal link between how a culture views and treats its 
older citizens, and memory performance. 
“If you live in a culture that views old age as being necessarily associated with 
memory decline, and everyone around you expects to see you having memory problems, 
then you will most likely behave in a way consistent with these expectations,”  Long 
noted. 
Findings such as these continue to damage our mostly negative conceptions of the 
effects of aging on metal abilities.  Rather than supporting the view that biological 
changes lead to inevitable losses, these findings suggest that the degree of memory loss is 
to a certain extent dependent upon the environment.
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APPENDIX N 
 
PILOT STUDY POST-TASK QUESTIONS 
 
 
The following questionnaire consists of a number of items that participants must respond 
to using various Likert scales. This is the last set of questions that participants respond to.  
 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all and 5=Very difficult 
 
1.   How difficult did you find the experimental task overall? 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all and 5=Very difficult 
 
2. How fatiguing did you find the experimental task overall?  
 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all and 5=Very much 
 
3. How focused were you on accurately recalling letters in the correct order during 
the experimental task? 
 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all and 5=Very much 
 
4. How focused were you on accurately verifying the math equations during the 
experimental task? 
 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
 
5. Did you feel stress or tension during this study? 
 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
 
6. Were you interested in this study? 
 
5-point scale where 1=Very little effort and 5= A lot of effort
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7. How much effort did you put into this study? 
 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all and 5= Always  
 
8. Did you get distracted easily during the study? 
 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all difficult and 5= Very difficult 
  
9. How difficult did you find the math portion of the experimental task?  
 
5-point scale where 1=Very poorly and 5= Very well 
 
10. How well do you think you did in this study? 
 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
 
11. Regardless of what you personally believe, do you think that there is a stereotype 
that women are inferior to men in terms of mathematical ability? 
Note: The above questions were used for Pilot Experiments 1 and 2. The post-task 
questionnaire for the proposed aging study was similar to this questionnaire. However, a 
few items will be changed to reflect the proposed study’s focus on memory-related aging 
stereotyped and accurate OSPAN letter recall. Items 9 and 11 will be rephrased for the 
proposed study: 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all difficult and 5= Very difficult 
 
9.  How difficult did you find the letter recall portion of the experimental task? 
 
5-point scale where 1=Not at all and 5= Very much 
 
11. Regardless of what you personally believe, do you think there is a stereotype that 
older adults are inferior to younger adults in terms of memory ability? 
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APPENDIX O 
 
AGE-ATTITUDES IAT STIMULI 
 
 
Old faces:  
   
   
 
Young faces: 
   
   
 
Pleasant words: 
 Joy, Love, Peace, Wonderful, Pleasure, Glorious, Laughter, Happy 
 
Unpleasant words:  
 Agony, Terrible, Horrible, Nasty, Evil, Awful, Failure, Hurt  
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APPENDIX P 
 
AGING STUDY RECALL ACCURACY AND THOUGHT PROBES OVER OSPAN 
BLOCK  
 
 
Letter recall accuracy over block for each condition  
  
 
 
Mean proportion of mind-wandering thought reports during the OSPAN for younger adults 
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Mean proportion of mind-wandering thought reports during the OSPAN for OA controls 
 
 
 
Mean proportion of mind-wandering thought reports during the OSPAN for OA ST relief 
 
 
154 
Mean proportion of mind-wandering thought reports during the OSPAN for OA ST primed 
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APPENDIX Q 
 
AGING STUDY YA CORRELATIONS 
 
 
 TUT Overall 
TRI 
Reactive 
TRI 
Proactive 
TRI 
On-
task 
Recall 
accuracy 
Math 
accuracy 
 
PTQ Task 
Diff 
 
-.182 
 
.241 
 
.052 
 
.341 
 
.043 
 
-.098 
 
-.043 
PTQ Recall 
Diff 
-.202 .368* .186 .431* -.005 -.337 .108 
PTQ Math 
Diff 
-.305 .244 -.011 .380* .154 -.146 -.062 
PTQ Effort -.492** .325 .176 .371* .284 -.111 .393* 
PTQ Fatigue -.138 .069 -.098 .194 .091 -.058 .281 
PTQ Stress -.095 .348 .262 .329 -.093 -.330 -.080 
PTQ Interest .016 -.497** -.519** -.353 .243 .541** -.068 
PTQ 
Distracted  
.627** -.291 -.038 -.433* -.426* -.105 -.051 
PTQ Recall 
Focus 
-.302 .196 .048 .273 -.176 -.024 .594** 
PTQ Math 
Focus 
-.499** .217 -.010 .355 .347 .045 .318 
DSSQ TUT .407* -.122 -.079 -.127 -.312 -.123 .213 
DSSQ TRI -.296 .294 .130 .359 .120 -.242 .106 
DSSQ 
Motivation 
.368* -.225 -.087 -.286 -.222 .104 -.273 
DSSQ SFA 
MIA Anxiety 
-.034 
-.096 
.009 
.104 
-.032 
.120 
.041 
.064 
.027 
.034 
-.127 
-.092 
-.008 
.043 
MIA Achieve -.327 .391* .243 .419* .098 -.279 .444* 
MIA Locus -.243 .213 .201 .170 .113 -.136 .100 
PANAS Pos .045 .339 .281 .304 .043 -.321 .167 
Cage -.108 .074 .073 .056 .061 -.400* .250 
 
Note. Explanations of all PTQ variables are given in Table 4; Explanations of all DSSQ variables 
are given in Table 5; Explanations of MIA and PANAS variables is given in Table 3; Cage = 
Chronological age in year; * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01.
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APPENDIX R 
 
AGING STUDY OVERALL OA CORRELATIONS 
 
 
 TUT Overall 
TRI 
Reactive 
TRI 
Proactive 
TRI 
On-task Recall 
accuracy 
Math 
accuracy 
 
PTQ Task 
Diff 
 
-.081 
 
.203 
 
.170 
 
.107 
 
-.113 
 
-.308** 
 
-.199 
PTQ Recall 
Diff 
-.042 .284** .326** .120 -.222* -.271* .076 
PTQ Math 
Diff 
.005 .161 -.042 .245* -.135 -.209 -.533** 
PTQ Effort -
.282** 
.055 .056 .012 .131 .009 .191 
PTQ Fatigue -.007 .105 .035 .139 -.101 -.302** -.118 
PTQ Stress -.008 .210 .143 .182 -.182 -.220 -.004 
PTQ Interest .258* -.038 -.071 .024 -.127 -.171 -.029 
PTQ 
Distracted  
.311** .100 -.088 .191 -.263* -.152 -.176 
PTQ Recall 
Focus 
-.111 -.177 -.068 -.162 .216* .521** -.339** 
PTQ Math 
Focus 
-.005 -.038 .049 -.068 .019 .131 .167 
DSSQ TUT .286** .258* .074 .293** -.393** -.076 -.257* 
DSSQ TRI .015 .431** .167 .433** -.391** -.117 -.121 
DSSQ 
Motivation 
.164 -.158 -.106 -.146 .044 .000 -.210 
DSSQ SFA -.082 .435** .220* .391* -.315** -.134 -.226* 
MIA Achieve 
MIA Anxiety 
-.175 
-.029 
.222* 
.251* 
.153 
.057 
.201 
.226* 
-.107 
-.175 
-.094 
-.170 
-.076 
-.036 
MIA Locus -.233* .038 .018 .006 .135 -.211 -.078 
PANAS Pos -.135 -.061 .087 -.134 .123 .115 .111 
Cage .114 -.115 -.051 -.115 .035 .238* .005 
 
Note. Explanations of all PTQ variables are given in Table 4; Explanations of all DSSQ variables 
are given in Table 5; Explanations of MIA and PANAS variables is given in Table 3; Cage = 
Chronological age in year; * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
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APPENDIX S 
 
AGING STUDY OA CONTROL CORRELATIONS 
 
 
 TUT Overall 
TRI 
Reactive 
TRI 
Proactive 
TRI 
On-task Recall 
accuracy 
Math 
accuracy 
 
PTQ Task 
Diff 
 
-.037 
 
.344 
 
.177 
 
.411* 
 
-.257 
 
-.151 
 
-.169 
PTQ Recall 
Diff 
-.070 .263 .151 .328 -.167 .055 .087 
PTQ Math 
Diff 
.074 .226 .199 .111 -.235 -.335 -.485** 
PTQ Effort -.503** .144 .042 .210 .224 -.069 .007 
PTQ Fatigue .068 .396* .264 .313 -.370* -.155 -.119 
PTQ Stress -.026 .481** .377* .326 -.376* -.097 .076 
PTQ Interest .414* -.047 .050 -.173 -.242 -.033 -.070 
PTQ 
Distracted  
.503** .032 .048 .018 -.368* .069 -.088 
PTQ Recall 
Focus 
-.022 -.566** -.624** .027 .478** .733** .115 
PTQ Math 
Focus 
-.065 -.299 -.364 .047 .289 .565** .428* 
DSSQ TUT .425* .087 .214 -.115 -.360 .080 .205 
DSSQ TRI .164 .391* .292 .201 -.431* -.172 .228 
DSSQ 
Motivation 
.211 -.219 -.179 -.097 .036 .055 -.440* 
DSSQ SFA 
MIA Anxiety 
-.006 
.160 
.161 
.257 
.215 
.200 
.004 
.075 
-.128 
-.319 
.129 
-.142 
.262 
.228 
MIA Achieve -.216 .279 .160 .206 -.081 -.338 .090 
MIA Locus -.191 -.194 -.164 -.081 .288 .000 -.288 
PANAS Pos -.365 -.091 -.195 .175 -.255 .240 .169 
Cage .019 -.197 -.252 .108 .160 .217 .021 
 
Note. Explanations of all PTQ variables are given in Table 4; Explanations of all DSSQ variables 
are given in Table 5; Explanations of MIA and PANAS variables is given in Table 3; Cage = 
Chronological age in year; * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
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APPENDIX T 
 
AGING STUDY OA ST RELEF CORRELATIONS 
 
 
 TUT Overall 
TRI 
Reactive 
TRI 
Proactive 
TRI 
On-
task 
Recall 
accuracy 
Math 
accuracy 
 
PTQ Task 
Diff 
 
-.072 
 
-.303 
 
-.281 
 
-.231 
 
.292 
 
-.195 
 
.007 
PTQ Recall 
Diff 
.339 -.015 .080 -.048 -.228 -.348 .302 
PTQ Math 
Diff 
.120 .076 .135 -.100 -.105 -.290 -.503** 
PTQ Effort .104 .311 .315 .038 -.255 -.061 -.181 
PTQ Fatigue -.225 -.449* -.352 -.091 .387* -.259 -.183 
PTQ Stress .016 -.140 -.033 -.133 .073 -.024 .148 
PTQ Interest .367 -.111 -.107 .007 -.175 -.302 .200 
PTQ 
Distracted  
.316 .237 .280 -.092 -.315 -.282 -.191 
PTQ Recall 
Focus 
-.404* .251 .189 .247 .049 .058 .110 
PTQ Math 
Focus 
-.147 -.075 -.205 .281 .084 .132 .363 
DSSQ TUT .476** .228 .230 .023 -.438* -.418* -.558** 
DSSQ TRI -.096 .100 .348 -.175 -.033 -.007 -.148 
DSSQ 
Motivation 
-.025 -.032 -.019 -.170 .093 -.217 -.007 
DSSQ SFA 
MIA Anxiety 
.052 
-.215 
.319 
.350 
.384* 
.415* 
-.041 
-.198 
-.223 
-.013 
-.038 
.220 
-.400* 
.144 
MIA Achieve -.087 .188 .226 .256 -.162 -.138 -.282 
MIA Locus -.236 -.165 -.172 -.189 .315 -.121 -.189 
PANAS Pos .016 .234 .163 .267 -.212 -.093 -.234 
Cage -.132 .012 -.016 .000 .088 .197 -.204 
 
Note. Explanations of all PTQ variables are given in Table 4; Explanations of all DSSQ variables 
are given in Table 5; Explanations of MIA and PANAS variables is given in Table 3; Cage = 
Chronological age in year; * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
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APPENDIX U 
  
AGING STUDY OA ST PRIMED CORRELATIONS 
 
 
 TUT Overall 
TRI 
Reactive 
TRI 
Proactive 
TRI 
On-task Recall 
accuracy 
Math 
accuracy 
 
PTQ Task 
Diff 
 
-.122 
 
.366 
 
.272 
 
.260 
 
-.272 
 
-477** 
 
-.376* 
PTQ Recall 
Diff 
-.221 .344 .046 .444* -.194 -.419* .004 
PTQ Math 
Diff 
-.134 .209 .387* -.072 -.113 -.155 -583** 
PTQ Effort -.323 -.066 -.130 .031 .254 .054 .509** 
PTQ Fatigue .097 .069 .229 -.121 -.113 -.378* -.038 
PTQ Stress -.020 .271 .152 .240 -.236 -.487** -.146 
PTQ Interest .030 -.051 .068 -.137 .043 -.156 -.160 
PTQ 
Distracted  
.144 .155 364 -.127 -.225 -.358 -.213 
PTQ Recall 
Focus 
.025 -.170 -.039 -.205 .154 .650** .361 
PTQ Math 
Focus 
.169 .060 .167 -.075 -.164 -.048 -.076 
DSSQ TUT -.013 .410* .418* .183 -.390* .003 -.324 
DSSQ TRI -.028 .562** .604** .221 -.523** -.004 -.215 
DSSQ 
Motivation 
.309 -.142 -.156 -.052 -.066 -.023 -.306 
DSSQ SFA 
MIA Anxiety 
-.218 
-.103 
.624** 
.109 
.513** 
.125 
.396* 
.035 
-.468* 
-.030 
-.247 
-.213 
-.411* 
-.209 
MIA Achieve -.214 .245 .264 .096 -.097 .093 -.006 
MIA Locus -.267 .259 .226 .152 -.071 -.407* .091 
PANAS Pos -.050 -.181 -.284 .014 .207 .062 .430* 
Cage .316 -.142 -.049 -.155 -.058 .303 .176 
 
Note. Explanations of all PTQ variables are given in Table 4; Explanations of all DSSQ variables 
are given in Table 5; Explanations of MIA and PANAS variables is given in Table 3; Cage = 
Chronological age in year; * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
  
 
 
   
